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THE DISAPPEARANCE OF 
CORRUPTION AND THE NEW PATH 
FORWARD IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
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 Reformers cloak their plans for changing the campaign 
finance system in the language of corruption because of the 
Supreme Court. In Buckley v. Valeo, the 1976 case that put 
corruption at the center of campaign finance law, the Supreme 
Court held that the only acceptable justifications that could be 
used to impose limits on campaign contributions were the 
government’s interests in preventing “corruption and the 
appearance of corruption.” All other justifications would 
result in laws being struck down for violating the freedoms of 
the First Amendment. This article argues that the Court’s 
“corruption paradigm” has outlived its usefulness, however. It 
has been inconsistently applied, and it has led to more 
confusion than clarity. Because new legislation regulating 
campaign finance is likely to be struck down by the Court, 
Congress no longer has the stomach to regulate in this 
important area of the law. For this reason, the champions of 
campaign finance need to find a new path forward. One such 
path, proposed in this article, is to let Congress regulate 
campaign finance through its internal ethics rules. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Reformers cloak their plans for changing the campaign finance 
system in the language of corruption because of the Supreme Court. 
In Buckley v. Valeo,1 the 1976 case that put the concept of corruption 
at the center of campaign finance law, the Supreme Court held that 
the only acceptable justifications that the government could use for 
placing limits on the campaign contributions that could be given to 
political candidates were its interests in “preventing corruption and 
the appearance of corruption.”2 Any other interests offered by the 
government were deemed insufficient and were thus outweighed by 
the freedoms of the First Amendment. Since Buckley, the Court’s 
narrow doctrinal justifications of preventing both “corruption” and its 
“appearance” have been reiterated countless times.3 Barring a shift in 
the law, these twin goals will continue to be the criteria the Supreme 
Court will use in assessing the constitutionality of future statutory 
efforts to reform campaign finance. 
Given the state of the jurisprudence in this area, the challenges 
facing advocates of campaign finance reform would seem 
insurmountable. Because the Court accepts only a very narrow 
“corruption rationale” for imposing restrictions on campaign 
contributions, figuring out a new way to regulate money in politics has 
become increasingly difficult. Adding to this challenge is the fact that 
the Supreme Court has refused to abide by the status quo. Under 
Chief Justice John Roberts, it has unraveled long-standing provisions 
of campaign finance law. In Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission,4 the Court extended the protections of the First 
Amendment to for-profit corporations when it held that they possess 
a right to make unlimited “independent expenditures” to influence 
the outcomes of elections.5 More recently, in McCutcheon v. Federal 
 
 1.  424 U.S. 1 (1976).  
 2.  Id. at 25. 
 3.  See e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 378 (2000) (“The [Buckley] 
Court found the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption to be a 
constitutionally sufficient justification . . . . Missouri espouses those same interests of preventing 
corruption and the appearance of it.”) (citations omitted); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. 
Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 456 (2001) (recognizing the “‘sufficiently important’ 
government interest in combating political corruption”) (citing Nixon, 528 U.S. at 387–88); 
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 241 (2006) (“[Buckley] noted that the Government had sought 
to justify the statute’s infringement on those interests in terms of the need to prevent 
‘corruption and the appearance of corruption.’”).  
 4.  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 5.  Id. at 337–39.  
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Election Commission,6 the Court struck down the aggregate cap that 
the law had placed on individual campaign contribution limits, a cap 
that had been in place ever since Buckley.7 
To those who might advocate for campaign finance “reform,” the 
Supreme Court has thus become a major obstacle.8 It has not only 
struck down campaign finance regulations under the guise of the First 
Amendment, but also hampered other reform efforts by subjecting 
the role of money in politics to the straightjacket of its corruption 
rationale. Since 1976, the continued framing of these debates in the 
language of corruption and the appearance of corruption has led to 
disarray. The Court has defined corruption inconsistently, often in step 
with its own changing composition.9 Meanwhile, scholars have put 
forth their own competing definitions of corruption, conflicting ideas 
of how the Court should define the term, and, following a new line of 
inquiry, competing views of how the term would have been 
understood by the framers.10 
The problem with these efforts is that they have ultimately failed 
to advance the goals set out by campaign finance reformers. Focusing 
on the definition of corruption has provided a distraction that has 
kept this community from addressing the much more important 
question of whether money in politics should actually be regulated 
and, if so, how. The corruption debates, in short, have diverted its gaze 
and shifted its attention from answering bigger and more important 
questions. For this reason, “corruption” may no longer be a useful 
 
 6.  134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
 7.  Id. at 1462. 
 8.  It has also arguably made us obsessed with corruption. The polling data show that a 
majority of Americans see corruption as a problem in need of redress, and that most Americans 
place it near the top of the list of issues that they believe their leaders should tackle. See Jeffrey 
M. Jones, Americans Want Next President to Prioritize Jobs, Corruption, GALLUP  
(July 30, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/156347/americans-next-president-prioritize-jobs-
corruption.aspx; 77% of Americans Concerned about Government Corruption; Majority See it 
Getting Worse, JUDICIAL WATCH (Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.judicialwatch.org/press-
room/press-releases/new-judicial-watch-breitbart-poll-shows-77-of-americans-concerned-about-
government-corruption-majority-see-it-getting-worse/. 
 9.  See e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 447 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (challenging 
the majority’s narrow view of quid pro quo corruption); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 
U.S. 377, 389 (2000) (“In speaking of ‘improper influence’ and ‘opportunities for abuse’ in 
addition to ‘quid pro quo arrangements,’ we recognized a concern not confined to bribery of 
public officials, but extending to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the 
wishes of large contributors.”) (citing Buckley v. Valeo,  424 U.S. 1,  28 (1976)). 
 10.  See, e.g., Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 
(2009); Lawrence Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand “Corruption” to Mean, 102 
CAL. L. REV. 1 (2014); ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN 
FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED (2014). 
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heuristic device for remedying the woes that reformers believe exist 
in the campaign finance arena. With the passage of time, the many 
competing visions of the phrase “corruption” have left campaign 
finance reformers with a term that has lost its capacity to help move 
their conversation forward about what they should do to control the 
influence of money in politics.  
In effect, the usefulness of the concept of corruption has all but 
“disappeared.” In highlighting this phenomenon, this article does not 
argue that corruption can never be adequately defined. Rather, more 
subtly, it argues that corruption, as a basis for regulation, has lost its 
utility and that a new orientation may now be needed. 
When it comes to the other half of the Supreme Court’s narrow 
justification for allowing limits on campaign contributions—“the 
appearance of corruption”—the problem shifts. Regulating the 
influence of money in politics based on whether corruption “appears” 
to be present is an inherently risky and dangerous activity for courts 
to be engaged in. Justifying regulations based on appearances, 
especially when they have to be weighed by the courts, invites 
slippery-slope reasoning. Appearances may be unfounded. Or, they 
may be genuine, but difficult to measure. Despite this, we find that 
arguments predicated upon appearances—like arguments based on 
perceptions or fears—have increasingly found their way into various 
areas of election law.11 
Rather than engage in the debates over corruption and its 
appearance, this article seeks to forge a new path. That path involves 
ignoring the Supreme Court’s corruption paradigm altogether and 
circumventing the Court to enact new campaign finance rules. Instead 
of adopting a law, this article proposes that campaign finance reforms 
be passed by Congress through its internal ethical codes. These could 
be adopted by Congress alone, without the need for executive action, 
and they would not be reviewable by the courts. Bypassing the 
Supreme Court is essential because its sustained focus on the 
corruption rationale has managed to diverted our society’s collective 
attention from addressing more pressing concerns, including how 
political institutions might collectively work to regulate money in the 
political system. 
 
 11.  See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 197 (2008) (holding that 
an Indiana law requiring that voters provide a photo ID does not violate the U.S. Constitution 
and that Indiana advanced a legitimate state interest in trying to protect public confidence in the 
electoral process and in alleviating the fear of in-person voter fraud).   
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Election law scholars debate the meaning of corruption with the 
goal of winning over the Supreme Court to their vision of how the 
campaign finance system should be regulated. They have avoided 
stating publicly, however, that the problem may in fact lie with the 
Supreme Court itself. Most election law theorists grant too much 
deference to the courts. For instance, many of them concede that a 
majority of the Supreme Court is unlikely to overturn the Citizens 
United decision anytime soon, and yet they frame their advocacy, 
including how they define corruption, in a concerted effort to appeal 
to the Court’s conservative wing.12 Relying on the Supreme Court as 
the remedy of last resort, however, is a fundamental mistake. 
Election law scholars must begin to view the courts not as neutral 
arbiters, but as additional institutional settings in which campaign 
finance regulations are made. Like Congress, the courts are given a 
say in what the campaign finance system looks like. Like Congress, 
they have power to shape the contours of this important area of the 
law. To the extent that there has recently been a call to take an 
“institutional turn” in election law scholarship,13 however, it has 
curiously stopped short of seeking to change how we view the role of 
the courts. Given that a change in the Supreme Court’s composition 
may not come very soon, the challenge for campaign finance 
reformers is to figure out a way to regulate money in the political 
arena by means other than passing a statute subject to judicial 
review—ultimately by the Supreme Court. 
This article outlines the phenomenon behind the “disappearance 
of corruption” in greater detail. Part I reviews how the Supreme 
Court and scholars have defined the concept of corruption in 
regulating campaign finance. It also examines the use of a related 
concept, the appearance of corruption—the only other justification 
that the Supreme Court has given for upholding limits on campaign 
contributions. It argues that the Court’s longstanding focus on 
corruption has distracted our society from addressing other concerns. 
 
 12.  See Richard L. Hasen, Three Wrong Progressive Approaches (and One Right One) to 
Campaign Finance Reform, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y R. 21, 22 (2014) (“The key is to lay the 
groundwork for the Supreme Court to reverse Citizens United.”); Renata E. B. Strause and 
Daniel P. Tojaki, Between Access and Influence: Building a Record for the Next Court, 9 DUKE 
J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 179, 179 (2014) (“[E]vidence . . . should be collected and developed 
to support the next generation of reforms before the next Supreme Court.”). 
 13.  See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang, The Institutional Turn in Election 
Law Scholarship, in GUY-URIEL E. CHARLES, HEATHER K. GERKEN, & MICHAEL S, KANG, 
RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 90 (2011).  
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Meanwhile, regulations based on appearances of corruption are ill-
advised. Part II elaborates on why the issue threatening the political 
system is not corruption but rather institutional malfunction, and it 
advances the view that the role of the Supreme Court in regulating 
campaign finance may need to be rethought. Part II also reviews some 
of the proposals that have been put forth for carrying out 
extrajudicial reforms in this area. Part III then introduces an 
alternative proposal for passing campaign finance reform by means of 
Congress’s internal ethical rules and regulations. The article then 
concludes by weighing the efficacy and limits of this proposal. 
I.  THE DISAPPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION 
A.  The “Corruption” Paradigm 
Buckley v. Valeo examined the constitutionality of the 1974 
Amendments to the Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971 
(FECA),14 amendments that Congress enacted as a direct response to 
the Watergate scandal.15 In passing FECA, Congress attempted to 
construct a comprehensive system to regulate campaign finance in the 
United States. The statutory provisions of FECA created a scheme 
that restricted campaign contributions, limited campaign 
expenditures, increased reporting and disclosure requirements for 
political candidates, instituted a public financing system for 
presidential primaries, and established a new federal agency, the 
Federal Elections Commission (FEC), to supervise and oversee 
federal elections.16 
Congress’s new campaign finance scheme did not survive intact 
for very long, however. Within two years, the constitutionality of 
FECA came before the Supreme Court, and in Buckley, which struck 
down certain provisions of the 1974 Amendments to the original law, 
the Court set the parameters for what the future of campaign finance 
regulation would look like. It was Buckley that first subjected 
campaign finance regulation to First Amendment scrutiny, making it 
the lens through which all subsequent regulations concerning money 
in the political system would be viewed. The Court issued an opinion 
 
 14.  Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 99-443, 88 Stat. 1263 
(1974) (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 9031–9042 (West 2014)). 
 15.  See JAMES A. GARDNER & GUY-URIEL CHARLES, ELECTION LAW IN THE AMERICAN 
POLITICAL SYSTEM 642 (2012). 
 16.  Id. at 649.  
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that was long, complex, and cumbersome.17 
The distinction between campaign contributions and expenditures 
was among the most important that the Buckley opinion drew. 
Campaign contributions include the money given to political 
candidates. Campaign expenditures refer to the sums spent by the 
candidates and their campaigns, or to the money spent by third parties 
independently to influence elections.18 In its opinion, the Court found 
that limiting campaign contributions imposed only a “marginal 
restriction” upon the contributor’s First Amendment rights to free 
speech and open communication, while placing limits on expenditures 
infringed on “core political speech.”19 As a result, the Court subjected 
the contribution limits imposed on campaign donors only to “exacting 
scrutiny,” a lesser level than the strict scrutiny that was placed on the 
limits to campaign expenditures. 
In addition to giving contributions and expenditures different 
treatment under the First Amendment, the Court also upheld the 
distinction between contributions and expenditures in order to 
recognize that the government might have an interest in regulating 
campaign finance. Specifically, the Court held that the government’s 
interest in preventing “corruption and the appearance of corruption” 
outweighed the limits on free expression under the First Amendment 
that restricting campaign contributions otherwise imposed.20 “[T]o the 
extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro 
quo from current and potential officeholders,”21 reasoned the Court’s 
majority, they raise the specter of corruption. By contrast, campaign 
expenditures did not raise the possibility of corruption, and as such, 
their regulation was more easily viewed as violating one’s freedom of 
expression and the protections of the First Amendment.22 
A host of other stated goals of campaign finance reform—such as 
providing all citizens with equal influence over the electoral process, 
limiting the role of money in politics, and creating a more competitive 
 
 17.  It consisted of a 143-page unsigned per curiam opinion, of separate opinions by other 
justices that totaled 83 more pages, and several appendices, for a total of 294 pages. Scholars 
have noted the unusual length and complexity of the opinion in Buckley. See, e.g., Richard L. 
Hasen, The Nine Lives of Buckley v. Valeo, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE: THE PROBLEMS AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM 30 (Robert G. Boatright ed., 2011). 
 18. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a (West 2014); GARDNER & CHARLES, supra note 15, at 647–48 
(defining expenditures); at 720–72 (discussing the different types of third party expenditures).  
 19.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976). 
 20.  Id. at 29. 
 21.  Id. at 26–27.  
 22.  Id. at 46–47; see also Hasen, supra note 12, at 31. 
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political system—were explicitly rejected as insufficient government 
interests.23 In one of its famous passages, the Court in Buckley stated 
that “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some 
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of 
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.” 24 The result of 
Buckley was that the government could justify regulations placing 
limits on campaign contributions in order to prevent corruption or its 
appearance, while regulations placing limits on expenditures were 
subject to strict scrutiny25 and thus were likely to be struck down. 
Other than preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption, 
no other goals would be recognized to justify the regulation of money 
in politics. 
B.  The Problem with Corruption 
Without providing a precise definition of what corruption 
entailed, the Court in Buckley originally treated it as something akin 
to bribery. It reasoned that corruption occurred when “large 
contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current 
and potential office holders.”26 In this regard, corruption was likened 
to a kind of payoff—an exchange where the pre-arranged trading of 
votes was obtained for monetary gain. The Court further reasoned 
that allowing limits to be placed on political contributions was 
justified because “[t]o the extent that large contributions are given to 
secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office 
holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is 
undermined.”27 Large contributions of cash, in other words, opened up 
the possibility for an explicit exchange of money for votes, and this 
bordered on bribery. 
 Quid pro quo corruption, however, was ultimately only one of the 
definitions advanced, and, confusingly, corruption has meant other 
things to the Court at other times. If the Court’s definition arguably 
started off narrow in Buckley, it broadened in Austin v. Michigan 
 
 23.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25–27. 
 24.  Id. at 48–49. 
 25.  See DANIEL P. TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 283 (2013) (explaining how 
“Buckley was imprecise about the level of scrutiny that should be accorded to expenditure and 
contribution limits” but that “[s]ubsequent cases, however, have understood Buckley to require 
strict scrutiny for expenditure limits, meaning that they must be narrowly tailored to a 
compelling government interest”) (emphasis in original). 
 26.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26. 
 27.  Id. at 26–27. 
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Chamber of Commerce,28 and later in McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission,29 only to be cabined again under the jurisprudence of 
the Roberts Court. In Austin, which concerned a Michigan state law 
that prevented corporations from spending money from their 
treasuries to influence candidate elections,30 the Court recognized “a 
different kind of corruption,”31 which arose from the “corrosive and 
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are 
accumulated with the help of the corporate form”32 and “that have 
little to no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s 
political ideas.”33 This new, broader definition of corruption became 
known as the anti-distortion standard.34 The idea behind it is that large 
accumulations and spending of corporate wealth would be able to 
distort the normal political process.35 
 Later, in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,36 the Court 
again expanded the definition of corruption, this time showing a 
remarkable degree of deference to state legislative judgments. In 
upholding Missouri’s campaign contribution limits, the Court 
explained how corruption went beyond quid pro quo arrangements to 
cover the threat of “influencing” politicians who are too “compliant 
with the wishes of large contributors.”37 In a broader sense, the Court 
was suggesting that the concept of corruption should be defined 
beyond merely bribing government officials.38 
 The Court went further still in McConnell, the 2003 decision that 
upheld the key provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(BCRA). In McConnell, the Court found that “[j]ust as troubling as 
classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger that officeholders will 
decide issues” based “on the wishes of those who have made large 
 
 28.  494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 29.  540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 30.  Austin, 494 U.S. at 655. 
 31.  Id. at 660. 
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id.  
 34.  See Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14 
CONST. COMMENT. 127, 134–35 (1997) (referring to Austin’s distortion standard).  
 35.  The anti-distortion standard is rooted in strands of democratic theory, including the 
writings of scholars who believe that the decisions of public officials should reflect the views of 
those who elect them to office. According to this view, campaign contributions corrupt because 
those who give them do not reflect the opinion of the average citizen. They “distort” 
policymaking through their influence. Id. at 131, 133–35.  
 36.  528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
 37.  Id. at 389. 
 38.  Id. 
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financial contributions valued by the officeholder.”39 Here, the Court 
broadened the definition of corruption again, now extending it to the 
“undue influence” that someone could exert “on an officeholder’s 
judgment.”40 Undue influence is a slightly different concept both from 
quid pro quo corruption and anti-distortion. Quid pro quo corruption 
implies that it is corrupt for a person who holds public office to accept 
money directly in exchange for taking action. With quid pro quo 
corruption, the deal is explicit—both sides understand and agree that 
a trade is being made. The “undue influence” standard, by contrast, is 
much broader. Here, an officeholder does not take a contribution in 
direct exchange for casting his vote a certain way. Rather, he is 
corrupt when he casts his vote with any kind of monetary 
considerations in mind.41 
In short, the Court began to follow a pattern in its jurisprudence 
where it would emphasize the quid pro quo standard of corruption, 
but then suggest that corruption implies something else as well. “Once 
the Supreme Court announced in Buckley that the concern over 
corruption or even its appearance could justify limitations on money 
in politics,” explains Professor Samuel Issacharoff, “the race was on to 
fill the porous concept of corruption with every conceivable meaning 
advocates could muster.”42 Since Buckley, the Supreme Court’s 
singular focus on preventing corruption and its appearance has been 
reiterated dozens of times.43 In all of these cases, the Court has been 
tasked with deciding whether new campaign finance regulations 
might violate the First Amendment. And in all of them, the Court’s 
corruption rationale has remained steadfast, even though what the 
Court means by corruption, and how it has chosen to define the term, 
has waxed and waned. 
 
 
 39.  McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003).  
 40.  Id. at 150.  
 41.  See Burke, supra note 34, at 128–31. 
 42.  Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 121 (2010). 
 43.  See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990) (“[The 
Court] has also recognized that a legislature might demonstrate a danger of real or apparent 
corruption posed by such expenditures when made by corporations to influence candidate 
elections . . . .”); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000) (“[W]e spoke in 
Buckley of the perception of corruption “inherent in a regime of large individual financial 
contributions” to candidates for public office . . . as a source of concern ‘almost equal’ to quid 
pro quo improbity.” (citations omitted)); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 142 (2003) (“We are 
mindful, however, that Congress enacted § 323 as an integrated whole to vindicate the 
Government's important interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption.”). 
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The point here is not to provide an exhaustive review of all of the 
ways in which the Supreme Court has vacillated when it has come to 
explaining what it means by the term corruption. Rather, it is only to 
emphasize that its definitions have suffered from a lack of consistency. 
What the Supreme Court has considered corruption to mean has 
changed over time, often in step with the composition of the Court 
itself. The result, unsurprisingly, has been doctrinal incoherence. The 
Roberts Court has once again brought the definition of corruption 
back into line. In Citizens United, the Court dramatically narrowed its 
understanding of corruption, explicitly overruling Austin and rejecting 
the anti-distortion standard.44 In partially overruling McConnell as 
well, it found that political access and influence likewise did not 
constitute corruption.45 In an important part of the opinion, Justice 
Kennedy unequivocally stated that when “Buckley identified a 
sufficiently important government interest in preventing corruption 
and the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid 
pro quo corruption.”46  
Recently, in McCutcheon, Justice Roberts reiterated the Court’s 
current view that the only legitimate kind of corruption that 
government regulations may target is quid pro quo corruption. He 
then went on explicitly to explain that 
[s]pending large sums of money in connection with elections, but 
not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an 
officeholder’s official duties, does not give rise to such quid pro 
quo corruption. Nor does the possibility that an individual who 
spends large sums may garner ‘influence over or access to’ elected 
officials or political parties.47 
In short, McCutcheon rejected the undue influence standard. 
Professor Richard Briffault aptly sums up the state of affairs in this 
area of the law when he writes that “[t]he Court’s campaign finance 
jurisprudence is a mess, marked by doctrinal zigzags, anomalous 
distinctions, unworkable rules, and illogical results.”48 
 
 44.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348–50. 
 45.  Id. at 359–60 
 46.  Id. at 359. 
 47.  McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1438 (2014). 
 48.  See Richard Briffault, On Dejudicializing American Campaign Finance Law, in 
MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 174 (Monica Youn ed., 2011); see also Richard L. 
Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 581 (2011) 
(“[T]he Citizens United majority opinion is far less pure and coherent than its packaging 
suggests.”).  
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A precise definition of corruption has eluded academics as well. 
Scholars seem to find common ground when they criticize the 
Supreme Court, but no agreement when it comes to their own 
definitions. Thomas Burke identifies three categories of corruption in 
the Court’s jurisprudence: quid pro quo, monetary influence, and 
distortion. But these differ from the categories recognized and 
discerned by others. Zephyr Teachout, for example, has also examined 
this jurisprudence, but she argues that there are “five different 
clusters of the Supreme Court’s definitions of corruption,” not three.49 
Deborah Hellman warns that “the Court should be hesitant to define 
it [i.e., corruption] at all,” but then goes on to differentiate between 
her own three variations of the concept.50 John Joseph Wallis argues 
that there are only two categories of corruption.51 As is evident, the 
campaign finance debates have turned into a battle over defining 
corruption,52 with scholars also producing their own definitions and 
distinctions.53 
In his recent book, Republic, Lost,54 Professor Lawrence Lessig 
wades into these debates to offer a definition of corruption of his 
own. Lessig believes that corruption is a phenomenon that affects 
institutions, not individuals, and that it exists in society “without 
assuming evil or criminal souls at the helm.”55 In explaining what he 
means by “dependence corruption,” as he calls this phenomenon, 
 
 49.  Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, supra note 10, at 387.  
 50.  Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1388 (2013). Hellman’s three categories include corruption as the 
deformation of judgment, corruption as the distortion of influence, and corruption as the sale of 
favors. Id. at 1397–1400.  
 51.  These include “venal corruption” and “systemic corruption.” The former involves the 
pursuit of private economic interests through the political process, whereas the latter involves 
the economic distortion that happens when politicians create “economic rents” though 
“selectively granting economic privileges.” John Joseph Wallis, The Concept of Systemic 
Corruption in American Political and Economic History 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research 
Working Paper No. 10952) (2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10952. 
 52.  The literature here is large. See, e.g., Jacob Eisler, The Unspoken Institutional Battle 
over Anticorruption: Citizen’s United, Honest Services, and the Legislative Judicial Divide, 9 
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363 (2010); Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 118 (2010); Bryan R. Whitaker, A Legislative Strategy Conditioned on Corruption: 
Regulating Campaign Financing After McConnell v. FEC, 79 IND. L.J. 1063 (2004); Mark Philp, 
Defining Political Corruption, 45 POL. STUD. 436 (1997); David A. Strauss, Corruption, 
Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369 (1994). 
 53.  Thomas Burke argues that the challenge in coming up with a definition stems from the 
fact that we have no benchmark for corruption: “you cannot call something corrupt without an 
implicit reference to some ideal,” he writes. Burke, supra note 34, at 128.  
 54.  LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A 
PLAN TO STOP IT (2011). 
 55.  Id. at 17. 
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Lessig argues that our institutions become corrupt when the 
individuals who function within them change to depend on an outside 
force.56 In his view, outside money constitutes the corrupting influence 
in Congress.57 The effect that big money has on elections, how it skews 
the policy focus of officeholders, and how it unevenly advances the 
agendas of special interest groups are all serious issues in American 
politics that the Supreme Court’s current corruption paradigm has 
done little to address. Understood in this way, the problem that most 
threatens American politics is not “corruption” as the Supreme Court 
currently understands that term—after all, ordinary politicians may 
not be corrupt in the sense of quid pro quo, and may merely be 
playing by the rules of the game as they know it. Instead, the problem 
is “the system” itself. 
Building on the work of Dennis Thompson, who pioneered the 
distinction between corruption in its individual and institutional 
forms,58 and also on Zephyr Teachout’s work, which argues that a 
concern about corruption can be traced back to the framers, Lessig 
provides an interesting way of looking at an old problem. His concept 
of “dependence corruption” refers to a kind of corruption that 
pervades the institutions of government.59 The term “dependence 
corruption” does not refer to bribery. In fact, Lessig argues that the 
framers succeeded in guarding against bribery by outlawing the 
 
 56.  Id. at 19. In one of his examples, Lessig explains how when a compass’s arrow points in 
a direction, we believe it is toward true north. Yet when one rubs a lodestone on the compass’s 
casing, its needle shifts slightly and distorts reality. Likewise, the institution of Congress 
becomes corrupt when the pattern of influence operating upon the individuals within it draws 
them away from how that institution was intended to function. Id. at 231. 
 57.  The effect of money is that it only allows some in society to influence the outcomes of 
elections in a meaningful way. Lessig compares this situation to the White Primary Cases, a line 
of election law decisions in which the Supreme Court struck down the system of white-only 
primaries organized by the Democratic Party in Texas from which African-Americans were 
excluded. Because blacks could not vote in the primary, they had no say over who proceeded to 
the general election. In Lessig’s analogy, the way those with money are able to influence the 
primaries today works similarly. For the White Primary Cases, see, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 
U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); 
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 526 (1927); see generally Ellen. D. Katz, Resurrecting the White 
Primary, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 325 (2004); Michael J. Klarman, The White Primary Rulings: A 
Case Study in the Consequences of Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55 
(2001). 
 58.  See generally DENNIS F. THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO 
INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION (1995). 
 59.  As Lessig explains, “‘dependence corruption’ is a type of ‘institutional corruption’ and 
like institutional corruption, the claim rests on the ‘tendency’ that evolves within the institution 
of Congress.” Lawrence Lessig, Institutional Corruptions 14 (Edmund J. Safra Working Paper, 
No. 1, 2013). 
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corrupting influence of gifts from foreign nations in the Constitution. 
In writing their new Constitution, argues Lessig, the framers had one 
kind of dependence in mind for Congress—that it should be 
dependent on the people. In Federalist No. 52, the House of 
Representatives was described as the “branch of the federal 
government which ought to be dependent on the people alone.”60 
But because our elected leaders constantly need to fundraise, 
Lessig explains how in the last two decades Congress has developed a 
new dependency on an outside source—campaign cash. In 2010, the 
total amount spent on campaigns by all candidates for Congress was 
$1.8 billion.61 In 2012, according to the Center for Responsive Politics, 
that number jumped, and the total spent on congressional races was 
$3.6 billion, with an additional $2.6 billion spent on the presidential 
race.62 For those seeking office, fundraising has become a way of life, 
and this in turn institutionalizes extravagant largesse by the forces 
that seek influence. Lessig provides many examples of this throughout 
his book.63 In 2009, for instance, there were 13,700 registered lobbyists, 
and the lobbying industry spent $3.5 billion, twice as much as it spent 
in 2002.64 That amounts to about $6.5 million on average spent 
lobbying each member of Congress.65 
Lessig’s contribution to the campaign finance literature takes an 
important step in shining new light on an old problem. He raises the 
idea that the problems facing the campaign finance system may 
actually be institutional in nature, and he shows how the political 
system has been unable to regulate campaign finance in any kind of a 
collective manner. Moreover, Lessig grounds his contribution to the 
corruption debates in an originalist understanding of the Constitution. 
He makes us see how, to win office, politicians today are more 
dependent upon a limited group of wealthy funders than they are on 
 
 60.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 327 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
 61.  LESSIG, supra note 54, at 91.  
 62.  See The Big Picture: The Money Behind the Elections, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2014).  
 63.  For example, he cites former Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), the chairman of the Senate 
Finance Committee, who played a critical role in the debate over President Obama’s healthcare 
proposal. From 2003 to 2008, Baucus also received $5 million in campaign contributions from 
the insurance and health care industries. LESSIG, supra note 54, at 91, 99. 
 64.  Id. at 118. 
 65.  Id. Lessig also estimates that members of Congress today spend between 30 and 70 
percent of their time raising money—instead of deliberating as they were elected to do. And as 
the need for fundraising has increased, the amount of time members of Congress spend in 
committee meetings has dropped in inverse proportion. Id. 
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the actual people they represent. To keep giving, these funders need 
to be kept happy. To keep them happy, legislators must bend their will 
to the desires of these funders, even though Congress was designed to 
be “dependent on the People alone.”66 
But while Lessig lays out a foundation for thinking about the 
challenges of campaign finance in a novel way, he does not go far 
enough. Lessig introduces his theory of “dependence corruption” in 
order to sway the Supreme Court to his reading of what corruption 
entails.67 He stops short, however, of saying that we should avoid the 
Supreme Court altogether. This article takes that next step. 
The purpose here has been neither to provide a substantive 
summary of all of the literature on corruption nor a critique of it. 
Others have done this elsewhere.68 Rather, in reviewing the 
definitions of corruption put forth both by the Supreme Court and by 
various scholars, the goal here has been only to highlight the diversity 
of labels that exist for this term. As may be apparent, there are 
numerous definitions and understandings of what corruption might 
mean. Taken individually, some of these are useful. But taken 
collectively, the many irreconcilable definitions of corruption have not 
done much to move the conversation forward. 
The multiplication of corruption is the ultimate result of Buckley’s 
complicated legacy. In enacting the Federal Election Campaign Act, 
Congress had a number of objectives in mind. It sought to create 
public financing for federal elections, regulate the supply of money in 
politics, and equalize the amount of influence each person had in the 
political arena.69 With Buckley, however, the Supreme Court took the 
regulation of money in politics into its own hands, essentially shunting 
Congress aside. By taking campaign finance and cementing it as a 
 
 66.  LESSIG, supra note 54, at 231. 
 67.  See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, An Originalist Understanding of “Corruption,” 102 CAL. L. 
REV 1, 19 (2014) (noting how “I am, and have always been, an originalist . . . [and] I advance the 
argument that I have here . . . because there is a majority on the Supreme Court which calls 
itself ‘originalist’”). 
 68.  Quite a number of commentators have criticized Lessig’s concept of dependence 
corruption. For some of this literature, see, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Fixing Washington, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 550 (2012); Richard L. Hasen, Is “Dependence Corruption” Distinct from a 
Political Equality Argument for Campaign Finance Laws? A Reply to Professor Lessig, 12 ELEC. 
L. J. 305 (2013); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Corruption Temptation, 102 CAL. L. REV. 25 (2014); 
Bruce E. Cain, Is “Dependence Corruption” the Solution to America’s Campaign Finance 
Problems?, 102 CAL. L. REV. 37 (2014); and Seth Barrett Tillman, Why Professor Lessig’s 
“Dependence Corruption” Is Not A Founding Era Concept, 13 ELEC. L. J. 336 (2014).  
 69.  GARDNER & CHARLES, supra note 15, at 644–45. 
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First Amendment issue, Buckley turned campaign finance not into an 
individual problem or even into an institutional problem, but rather 
into a constitutional problem.70 
In focusing on corruption and the appearance of corruption as the 
only doctrinal justifications for reform, Buckley and its progeny have 
dramatically narrowed the range of our discourse. “We no longer talk 
about the gamut of values we would like to see reflected in a system 
of campaign financing,” argues Professor Guy-Uriel Charles, because 
“[t]o be taken seriously in this doctrinal debate, all of our discourse 
must be articulated within the corruption framework, which causes us 
to ignore other concerns that ought to be of interest when considering 
a system of campaign financing.”71 Charles labels this phenomenon 
the “corruption temptation.” What it amounts to is the insistence of 
scholars and activists to focus on the definition of corruption, instead 
of debating what values they want to advance when it comes to 
figuring out how to regulate the influence of money in politics.72 In 
debating definitions, reformers have left unaddressed the concerns 
about the political system that they initially sought to fix. Corruption 
has become a distraction. The more the term’s meaning gets debated, 
the less useful it becomes. This phenomenon is known as the 
disappearance of corruption. 
C.  The “Appearance” Paradigm 
Avoiding the appearance of corruption has repeatedly been cited 
by the Supreme Court as the other justification for sustaining limits 
on campaign contributions. Buckley specifically referred to the 
government’s interest in “combating the appearance or perception of 
corruption” that came from large campaign contributions and said 
that this other interest was “of almost equal importance” to 
combating corruption itself. Over the years, the “corruption” half of 
the equation has attracted most of the attention of scholars and 
commentators, some of whom believe that the Supreme Court viewed 
“the appearance of corruption” as not being as important.  
Though the Court said that the appearance of corruption was “[o]f 
almost equal concern,”73 treating appearance regulations as if they are 
a subset of corruption is a mistake. In upholding certain provisions of 
 
 70.  See Charles, supra note 68, at 26. 
 71.  Id.  
 72.  Id.  
 73.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976). 
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the 1974 Amendments to FECA, the Court in Buckley clearly 
explained how Congress “could legitimately conclude that the 
avoidance of the appearance of improper influence ‘is also critical . . . 
if confidence in the system of representative government is not to be 
eroded.’”74 In McConnell, the Court likewise explicitly referred to the 
“[g]overnment’s strong interest in preventing corruption, and in 
particular the appearance of corruption.”75 In effect, the appearance 
of corruption is an equal second category under which campaign 
finance regulations may be justified.76  
But this second category has been poorly conceptualized, and it is 
not at all well understood. Instead of being based on empirical claims, 
it hinges on public perceptions. Perceptions, however, can be messy 
and subjective, and they may not always be accurate. Appearances can 
lead to cascading effects that unintentionally skew reality when they 
cover up the truth. Our citizens would be wise not to think highly of 
courts that rule on regulations based on appearances, without proof of 
an underlying problem’s existence. 
Scholars have long recognized that appearance regulations can 
take on a life of their own.77 For instance, regulations can be aimed at 
curbing appearances even when no misdeeds actually underlie them. 
To get around this danger, some scholars have sought to study the 
regulation of appearances.78 Within the legal academy, the scholar who 
has built the most robust framework for evaluating the government’s 
appearance regulations is Adam Samaha.79 Samaha warns, however, 
that appearance arguments can be “slippery” and “troublesome” 
when made by those claiming to be working for the public welfare.80 
Take the example of a bad neighborhood. Should policing strategies 
 
 74.  Id.  (citations omitted). 
 75.  McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 156 (2003). 
 76.  However, the fact that it is equal does not, on its own, mean it is distinct.  There exists 
some debate about whether the “appearance of corruption” constitutes a distinct category of 
regulation. At least some scholars believe that the two form separate categories, similar to the 
view advanced here. Among others, the scholar Mark Warren argues that corruption and the 
appearance of corruption are entirely distinct concepts. See Mark E. Warren, Democracy and 
Deceit: Regulating Appearance of Corruption, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 160 (2006). 
 77.  Id. at 162. 
 78.  Id. at 172.The literature also includes Deborah Hellman, Judging by Appearances: 
Professional Ethics, Expressive Government, and the Moral Significance of How Things Seem, 60 
MD. L. REV. 653 (2001) and Matthew D. Adler, Expression and Appearance: A Comment on 
Hellman, 60 MD. L. REV. 688 (2001).  
 79.  Adam Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1563 
(2012).  
 80.  Id. at 1567.  
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try to stop crime from happening merely by changing what the 
appearance of a neighborhood looks like?81 That question may or may 
not be answered in the affirmative. Even if it is, however, it is not the 
same thing as saying that it would be wise for courts to get involved in 
the regulation of appearances.82 
To confront the problems inherent in appearance regulations, 
Samaha builds a kind of framework to help evaluate claims that a 
government decision is justified because it will create a “desirable 
appearance.”83 He does this by looking at situations where appearance 
and reality diverge. When appearances reflect reality, Samaha argues, 
the evaluation of a law promulgated to correct that reality is 
straightforward. But if appearance and reality diverge, then questions 
undoubtedly arise with respect to any government decisions that may 
be taken based on the appearance alone. 
There are three ways of thinking about the relationship. The first 
involves situations where reality and appearance fully diverge. 
Samaha gives the example of a bridge crossing a river connecting two 
towns.84 This bridge can appear decrepit but be safe, or it can appear 
to be safe but actually lack structural integrity in a way that only an 
engineer would notice. Either way, regardless of what the bridge looks 
like, it is not safe. To make people think the bridge is safe, however, 
 
 81.  Known as “broken windows policing,” this justification for using appearances to 
regulate crime is familiar to many criminologists and to many people who have driven through a 
“bad” neighborhood. The term has been attributed to the work of the sociologists James Q. 
Wilson and George L. Kelling. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: 
The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1, 1982, at 29. For a criticism 
of the theory, mainly on the grounds that studies of it often suffer from empirical failures, see 
generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN 
WINDOWS POLICING 59–89 (2001). In the law review literature, some of this inquiry can be 
found in Tracey L. Meares & Dan Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 805 (1998). The judgments we make about neighborhoods based on their 
appearances may not be different from those we make about people based on their grooming 
and dress, a phenomenon that has also been studied by legal scholars. See DEBORAH RHODE, 
THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE IN LIFE AND LAW (2010).  
 82.  As Samaha warns:  
Appearance arguments can be slippery and, often enough, troublesome when asserted 
by those who claim to be working for the public good. Consider campaign finance 
litigation. Courts have validated a government interest in appearing noncorrupt 
without much explanation of how or why it should matter. Are we supposed to think 
that government is entitled to appear noncorrupt even if it is, in fact, riddled with 
corruption? Are defenders of campaign finance laws claiming to know that the 
government is basically free of corruption?  
Samaha, supra note 79, at 1567.  
 83.  Id. at 1567. 
 84.  Id. at 1575.  
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town elders can decide to put struts on the outside of it, thus 
improving it only to provide the appearance of safety.85  
Second, there are situations where appearances may drive reality 
over time. Appearance and reality may initially diverge, that is, but as 
time passes reality becomes what appears to be true. The “bank run” 
is the best example of this phenomenon. That concept explains how 
the meltdown of something as large as a financial institution takes 
place. If depositors believe there will be a run on the bank, their 
beliefs will precipitate an actual bank run when they scramble to 
withdraw their savings. Even if they are not the ones who caused the 
run in the first place, their actions will accelerate it.86 In this sense, 
appearances can become self-fulfilling prophesies. 
Finally, reality can also collapse into appearance. The example 
Samaha gives is the use of time.87 Watches and clocks provide an 
agreed-upon social convention for keeping time. While official time, 
or Greenwich Mean Time, is kept in England, local time, whether 
official or not, nonetheless becomes a point of reference for countless 
information systems. Almost all of modern society—from trains to 
airports to banks—relies on the social construct of time that the 
watches that our citizens wear represent. But time is nothing more 
than a human convention,88 a way of solving coordination problems at 
their most basic and most intuitive level, and the time that is shown 
on a clock is very different from the real concept of time, as measured 
by space, the cosmos, and the universe. Despite this, the appearance of 
time on a clock turns into reality for most people.89 
 
 85.  Id. at 1576. 
 86.  Id. at 1578. Or take another example, that of the “tipping point.” During a public 
performance, it is customary for the audience to clap. If the performance was especially good, 
members of the audience will also stand as they clap. Of course, some audience members may 
not think the performance warrants a standing ovation, but the fact that a part of the audience is 
already standing causes other audience members to stand as well. In short, a person may find 
herself standing and clapping regardless of whether she really enjoyed the show, because of 
what others are doing. For cast members, this audience’s actions may not always reflect true 
reality, but they drive reality over time, as more people join the standing ovation. 
 87.  Id. at 1580–81. See also TODD D. RACKOFF, A TIME FOR EVERY PURPOSE: LAW AND 
THE BALANCE OF LIFE (2002) (chronicling the law’s effect on our use of time and arguing that 
the structure of time establishes the terms by which society allocates its efforts). 
 88.  Samaha, supra note 79, at 1581. 
 89.  To show that time is a construct, we can look at how governments use it differently. In 
Russia, which has eleven times zones, all of the trains run on “Moscow” time. In China, the 
government requires the entire country to function on “Beijing” time. Thus the appearance of 
time in China may be different from the actual time zone China happens to be located in. 
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D.  The Problem with Appearances 
In situations where citizens do not know whether appearance and 
reality are one and the same, governments have been known to 
regulate on the basis of appearances. For example, they often do this 
to prevent the unnecessary taking of risk. Cass Sunstein has labeled 
this kind of action “the precautionary principle,” although in his view, 
what the principle actually stands for is rather vague.90 In its most 
distinctive form, the principle imposes a burden of proof on those 
who create risks to society. But Sunstein believes that, out of 
precaution, governments tend to overregulate risks, even if they 
cannot show that they will produce significant harms.91 
Perhaps the same can be said of the regulation of appearances in 
campaign finance. Politics will always appear corrupt to someone, and 
on that basis many will believe that the “appearance of corruption” 
needs to be regulated, even when there is no evidence that actual 
corruption is underfoot. The Supreme Court relied on the logic of 
appearance regulation in Crawford v. Marion County Election 
Board,92 the 2008 case upholding Indiana’s requirement that voters 
provide a photo ID to vote.93 The Court found the state’s interest of 
promoting public confidence and preventing the fear of in-person 
voter fraud among citizens a legitimate justification for Indiana’s 
voter ID requirement.94 Indiana could not offer any actual proof that 
voter fraud had occurred in the state and instead relied on voters’ 
fears that voter fraud might occur.95 The problem was that there was 
 
 90.  See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE 26 (2005). The precautionary principle is used to cope with risks where scientific 
understanding is incomplete, such as the risks of nanotechnology, genetically modified 
organisms, and systemic insecticides. It is used by policy makers to justify discretionary 
decisions in situations where there is the possibility of harm from making a certain decision 
when extensive scientific knowledge on the matter is lacking. According to it, regulations can be 
relaxed only if further scientific findings emerge that provide sound evidence that no harm will 
result. In some jurisdictions, such as the European Union, the application of the precautionary 
principle has been made a statutory requirement in certain areas of law. 
 91.  Indeed, Sunstein argues that the precautionary principle, as practiced today, should be 
rejected. This is not because it leads in bad directions, but because it leads in no direction. Every 
step taken by a government creates a risk to health, the environment, or safety. The question is 
where policymakers should draw the line. Id. at 4–5. 
 92.  553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 93.  Id. at 181. 
 94.  Id. at 196. 
 95.  Id. at 194 (“The record contains no evidence of any such fraud actually occurring in 
Indiana at any time in its history.”). Some scholars argue that the Supreme Court has recently 
been giving too much deference to asserted state interests when it comes to regulating the 
voting process, and that it should reverse course. States will often assert their interests through 
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little empirical research about what people’s beliefs were, or about 
whether those beliefs were even rational.96 
Likewise, the available research suggests that the public’s 
perceptions of corruption may not always be well-founded. The 
conservative Center for Competitive Politics sought to discover what 
the average American thinks about several related campaign-finance 
issues: from public financing to contribution limits on donations to 
campaign disclosure rules to the appearance of corruption.97 It also 
sought to discover at what point contributions given to congressional 
candidates were deemed to be corrupting.98 In 2011, at the time of the 
Center’s survey, the contribution limit was $2,500, yet the median 
amount above which respondents said they believe there would 
appear to be a corrupting influence on politicians was $10,000.99 This 
research, if true, demonstrates that current federal individual 
contribution limits may be too low to trigger an “appearance of 
corruption” in the public’s eye.100 Setting individual contribution limits 
at their current level has not had an impact on public opinion, and it is 
not clear that perceptions of the appearance of corruption would 
change if these limits were raised to levels as high as $10,000.101 
Other research has demonstrated that the public’s perception of 
the existence of corruption may also not be directly correlated with 
the government’s reform efforts, but rather may be attributable to 
other variables. Professors Nathaniel Persily and Kelli Lammie, who 
have studied this phenomenon, argue that trends in the public’s 
 
platitudes such as “ensuring election integrity,” and such explanations have rarely been 
questioned adequately by federal courts. See Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)trusing the States to Run 
Elections, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. (manuscript at 5–6) (forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/results.cfm?RequestTimeout=50000000. 
 96.  A well-known academic study based on polling data and voting records found that 
there was no correlation between people’s beliefs about the prevalence of voter fraud and 
electoral turnout. Similarly, there was no correlation between the strength of a state’s voter 
identification requirements and people’s beliefs about voter fraud. See Nathaniel Persily & 
Stephen Ansolabehere, Voter Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The Roles of Public Opinion in 
the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1750–60 (2008).  
 97.  JASON FAREELL & NIMA VEISEH, CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POL., PUBLIC PERCEPTION 
AND THE “APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION” IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.campaignfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Public-Perception-and-the-
Appearance-of-Corruption-in-Campaign-Finance-Report-Final.pdf.  
 98.  Id. at 3.  
 99.  The Center for Competitive Politics concluded that there does not appear a logical 
reason why the contribution limit of $2,500 was the limit for contributions. Instead, people think 
that $10,000 is the corruptible limit, the study found, while the standard of $2,500 “seems to 
have no quantitative or psychological effects.” Id. at 3.  
 100.  Id. at 2. 
 101.  Id. at 4.  
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perception of corruption have little to do with the campaign finance 
system at all. Rather, a number of extraneous factors influence why 
people’s perceptions of corruption in government rise and fall.102 
Among them, a person’s socioeconomic status is likely to be a key to 
influencing the person’s perceptions of corruption.103 Moreover, one’s 
perception of corruption is influenced by preexisting biases.104 
Whatever factors contribute to this, they may not be tied to logic or 
empirical reality. And if they are not, then regulating campaign 
finance based on appearances might present a slippery slope. 
A closely related problem is that when the appearance of 
corruption exists, it does little to solve the puzzle of causation. We do 
not know if corrupt officials appear corrupt in the minds of citizens, or 
if regulating the appearance of corruption works to lessen how 
corrupt officials are, with the arrow pointing in the other direction. 
Numerous phenomena influence the level of corruption in society, 
including such things as the salaries of government workers. At the 
same time, the public’s perception of corruption may be influenced by 
different phenomena, such as term limits or a jurisdiction’s 
redistricting process, that are extraneous to the actual facts related to 
the individuals holding public office. Given the many variables at play, 
it would seem ill-advised for judges to wade into weighing appearance 
regulations. This is especially so because the ultimate danger when 
people fear corruption tends not to be fully specified in cases where 
appearance justifications are used.105 As Samaha explains, courts often 
make “untested yet confident assertions about the effects of 
regulation. They myopically picture the political system as if it were a 





 102.  Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perception of Corruption and Campaign Finance: 
When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 119 (2004). 
Looking at forty years of survey data about the attitudes that citizens have concerning 
corruption in government, Persily and Lammie found that a person’s perception of corruption 
derives to a large extent from his (1) position in society, including his race, income, and 
educational level; (2) his or her opinion of the incumbent president and the performance of the 
economy of the previous year; (3) his or her attitude concerning taxation and “big government”; 
and (4) his or her propensity to trust other people in general. Id. at 119–21. 
 103.  Id. at 121.  
 104.  See id. 
 105.  See Samaha, supra note 79, at 1599.  
 106.  Id. at 1619. 
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People may also not be telling the truth when it comes to their 
views of appearances, again making it difficult to measure whether 
they reflect reality. This phenomenon is well-known to those who 
study polling. The so-called “Bradley Effect,” for instance, has come to 
define the electoral loses of African-American politicians, or else their 
wins by smaller margins than expected.107 Over and over, we find that 
African-American political candidates perform better in opinion polls 
when they run against white candidates than they do in actual 
elections. Pollsters have suggested the reason is that voters may not 
want to admit to planning to vote against a black candidate because 
they fear being perceived as racist, so they do not tell the truth to 
pollsters when asked which candidate they will vote for. 
Appearances are a dangerous method of regulation for courts, in 
particular, to engage in. Judges are not trained as empiricists, and 
therefore may have no way to identify instances when appearance 
and reality diverge. The consequence of poor appearances may be 
sagging public confidence, but sagging confidence does not necessarily 
translate into more corruption.108 Teasing out whether perceptions 
reflect reality is not a problem the courts should be charged with 
tackling. Although judges can be trained to discern when appearances 
reflect reality and when the two diverge, they are not, by and large, 
trained to weigh causation. With few exceptions, judges are simply not 
social scientists.109 
Yet upon reflection, many regulations are based on appearances. 
This is true of regulations affecting crime, it is true of regulations 
affecting public safety, and it is also true of regulations affecting the 
securities markets. When these regulations are promulgated by 
legislatures, it may be in our best interest. But when they are 
mandated—or struck down—by courts based on mere perceptions or 
appearances, it is troublesome. The practice becomes suspect because 
 
 107.  The concept is named for Tom Bradley, an African-American man who in 1982 ran for 
governor in California. In polls leading up to the election, Bradley had a clear lead, and 
numerous media outlets projected he would win the election. On election night, he lost to the 
Republican candidate. A primary explanation for why he had higher poll numbers leading up to 
election night is racial. See Gregory S. Parks & Jeffrey J. Rachlinki, Implicit Bias, Election ’08, 
and the Myth of a Post-Racial America, 37 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 702–03 (2010); Gregory S. 
Parks & Quinetta M. Roberson, “Eighteen Million Cracks”: Gender’s Role in the 2008 
Presidential Election, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 321, 341 n.160 (2011). 
 108.  Samaha, supra note 79, at 1619.  
 109.  As of this writing, there is only one jurist in the federal courts who holds Ph.D. in a 
social science field. That is Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014). 
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we cannot be confident that courts are capable of regulating 
appearances. As Robert Bauer has astutely written, the appearance of 
corruption as a basis for campaign finance regulation is suspect on 
two counts, depending on the observer: 
[A]ppearances are either useless appendages to demonstrated 
instances of quid pro quo corruption, or they are rhetorical 
compensation for their absence. If there is corruption, then the 
appearance of it may be self-evident, but beside the point. Absent 
corruption, placing the full weight of the state regulatory interest 
on ‘appearances’ guarantees contention, since the regulatory 
regime’s advocates will often perceive what its critics do not see.110 
In short, appearance regulations are unlike anything else in our 
legal system. They are a mechanism by which courts are asked to 
reject or sustain campaign finance laws, even when all of the evidence 
suggests that courts are not good at weighing appearances in the first 
place. In the context of corruption, what constitutes reality and what 
appears to constitute reality are made to stand on equal footing.111 
And yet, allowing a regulation based on the appearance of reality is a 
rationale for regulation that has few counterparts in other aspects of 
the law. At the end of the day, appearance regulations are neither wise 
nor helpful. They do not advance sound judgment. The time has come 
for a different path. 
II.  RETHINKING THE ROLE OF THE COURTS 
A.  Conflicting Values 
We need to shift our attention away from corruption and its 
appearance, because what threatens the American political system has 
little to do with corruption, and even less to do with the appearance of 
corruption—an even more amorphous concept. The Supreme Court’s 
definition of corruption in Buckley, and more recently in Citizens 
United and McCutcheon, is tied closely to the concept of quid pro quo 
corruption, and it involves the sale of an official office or of a vote for 
 
 110.  Robert F. Bauer, The Varieties of Corruption and the Problem of Appearance, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 91, 91 (2012).  
 111.  And this can invite regulation on an indiscriminate basis. See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, 
Fighting the Appearance of Corruption, 6 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 171, 177–78 (2001) (arguing 
that “a focus on appearances creates a strong temptation to engage in superficial analysis of 
what kind of campaign finance reform is most needed” because “the most zealous and 
aggressive advocates of restriction can make accusations, whether well founded or not, and then 
use the very fact that some people believe the charges as a reason to justify regulation”).  
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personal gain. But the problem is not that government officials are 
selling their votes once they get to office (although there may be cases 
where they have), but that the system for electing these officials is 
dysfunctional. It privileges those who either have money or can raise 
it, and the influx of money distorts elections by giving an outsize voice 
to the wealthy and powerful. That is more or less the basis of the 
problem that American democracy faces today.112 What this 
phenomenon is called is less important, of course, than understanding 
its existence. 
Yet to say that the problem in the campaign finance system has to 
do with money does not quite reach the root of the issue, either. The 
evidence is uncontroverted that money influences the outcome of 
American political campaigns. Public officials need to raise money to 
win office, and money provides a greater voice to those who have it, 
while making the playing field less equal for those who do not. The 
political system, as currently structured, provides a preference to 
individual wallets over individual voices—and votes. From this 
perspective, it is reasonable to believe that the issue that needs 
addressing is how the large sums of money given by a small number 
of donors influence the outcomes of electoral campaigns. It may 
follow that what needs to be regulated is the effect of money on 
elections.113 Money is certainly the issue Lessig addresses in his book 
when he refers to “dependence corruption.” But while the role of 
money is important, it arguably still does not quite get to the root of 
the problem that afflicts our democracy. 
 
 
 112.  See, e.g., Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil 
Is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 302 (1989) (arguing that the payment of money to 
sway the decisions of a person in public office is a practice that is somehow anti-American and 
that the abhorrence of it that Americans have is deeply rooted in their culture).  
 113.  There is, of course, a large popular literature concerning the role of money in politics 
that suggests this. See, e.g., ROBERT G. KAISER, SO DAMN MUCH MONEY: THE TRIUMPH OF 
LOBBYING AND THE CORROSION OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (2009); MARTIN H. REDISH, 
MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY (2001); 
JEFFREY N. BIRNBAUM, THE MONEY MEN: THE REAL STORY OF FUND-RAISING’S INFLUENCE 
ON POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2000); ANTHONY GIERZYNSKI, MONEY RULES: 
FINANCING ELECTIONS IN AMERICA (2000); and DARRELL M. WEST, CHECKBOOK 
DEMOCRACY: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS (2000). On the other hand, not 
everyone believes that the presence of money in the political arena poses a threat to democracy. 
See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, The Myth of Campaign Finance Reform, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE: 
THE PROBLEMS AND CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM (Robert G. Boatright ed., 2011); BRADLEY 
A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (2001); and Bradley 
A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequence of Campaign Finance Reform, 
105 YALE L. J. 1049 (1996). 
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The real root of the dilemma is that our pluralist society contains 
a basic conflict between two values that are critical to democracy. The 
first value is political freedom, and the second is political equality. 
These conflicting values—freedom and equality—create a tension in 
the way that the campaign finance system should operate. And the 
true problem facing American democracy today, at its most basic 
level, has to do with the way that the Supreme Court has chosen to 
resolve the underlying conflict between these values. The Supreme 
Court’s decisions have tended to favor the political freedom of a few 
individuals to spend as they wish at the expense of offering equal 
political representation to a broader group of citizens. This choice 
negatively affects elections and profoundly changes the tenor of how 
the American political system operates. It forces society to move away 
from elections where the majority elects the candidate who it thinks 
best represents its interests, to elections where the majority votes for 
the candidate who is best able to broadcast his virtues through 
expensive campaign advertising. 
When viewed in this light, neither big money in politics nor 
corruption is the challenge that Americans face. Rather, the challenge 
is that our society possesses conflicting normative values that our 
current institutional structure is incapable of resolving by itself. 
Different institutions view campaign finance differently, so much so 
that they are often in conflict with each other. Nor does the 
Constitution resolve which branch of government, Congress or the 
courts, should be responsible for settling this conflict. 
B.  Courts Cannot Help 
Although this article has argued that courts are ill-suited to 
regulate the fundamental conflict of values that appears in the 
campaign finance arena, it is worth pausing for a moment to consider 
the continued deference that scholars give to courts. One of the 
prominent recent debates in election law has pitted two scholarly 
camps against one another. Each of these is concerned with judicial 
review, debating whom it should seek to benefit. 
Scholars of “process theory” look to John Hart Ely as their 
forbearer in seeking to remedy what Ely referred to as “stoppages in 
the democratic process.”114 Without the intervention of the courts, 
 
 114.  JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 117 
(1980). 
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process theorists such as Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Richard 
Pildes argue that the political arena is prone to “partisan lockups,” 
and that these lockups constitute “market failures” in normal 
democratic politics that justify judicial intervention.115 Process 
theorists believe that judicial review is justified, even necessary, in two 
situations—where the political process may have malfunctioned 
because political elites have designed it in a way that will protect their 
incumbency and benefit them, or where the political process allows 
harm to accrue to political minorities. As Ely put it: 
Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of trust, when 
(1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change to 
ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) 
though no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives 
beholden to an effective majority are systematically 
disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or a 
prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest, and 
thereby denying that minority the protection afforded other 
groups by a representative system.116 
In the field of election law, process theories have been used to argue 
that judicial review should be used to attack structural mechanisms 
that inhibit competition and otherwise preserve the power of those in 
office. 
Another group of scholars, however, has been very skeptical of 
process-based theories. These scholars argue that process theory 
amounts to a “shallow theory” that says little about how the courts 
should intervene in instances of market failure.117 Instead of 
intervening to remedy a broken political process, these scholars justify 
the courts’ intervention in regulating the political process on the basis 
of guaranteeing “political equality” to citizens. Most core equality 
rights are the product of a social consensus that has emerged among 
citizens, like that each person should be granted an equally weighted 
vote.118 Other rights are more contested.119 In contrast to the process 
theorists, Professor Richard Hasen and other advocates of equality 
 
 115.  See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H, Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of 
the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998) (calling for a shift away from focusing on 
individual rights to an emphasis on how markets work to allow partisan control).  
 116.  ELY, supra note 114, at 117 (emphasis in original). 
 117.  See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING 
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 6 (2003).  
 118.  See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964). 
 119.  HASEN, supra note 117, at 7–8. 
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would prefer to see a rights-based approach to judicial review that 
focuses on protecting core political rights: “courts remain the 
government actors of last resort who must referee some high-stakes 
political battles and protect basic rights of political equality,” writes 
Hasen, “and the Supreme Court by necessity sets the basic rules and 
defines the protective floor.”120 
What unifies the above two approaches is that both process 
theorists and equality advocates consistently look to the courts for 
solace. Pildes and Issacharoff seek judicial intervention to rescue a 
political process that is mired in gridlock. Hasen wants the courts to 
make it so that there is a level playing field for all citizens who 
participate in the political process. Yet neither of these dominant 
paradigms in election law apply particularly well in the campaign 
finance context, precisely because they give too much deference to 
the courts—and to the Supreme Court, in particular. 
Seeking solace from the courts ignores the fact that the courts 
themselves may be “locked up” in a political struggle in which they 
have a vested stake, and are incapable of moving things forward. Take, 
for example, the effort of the courts to address partisan 
gerrymandering. Most Americans think that gerrymandering is one of 
the greatest ills afflicting their democracy,121 and yet the courts have 
not been willing to agree on whether this issue is even justiciable, 
much less on what judicial standard should govern the resolution of 
gerrymandering disputes.122 Similarly, when it comes to questions of 
campaign finance, the courts may be locked up and thus find 
themselves in no different a position from the legislature. 
Despite this, those who champion reforming the campaign finance 
system keep looking to the Supreme Court for a remedy. Hasen 
implores progressive thinkers on campaign finance reform to refrain 
from what he calls three “misguided approaches to reform.”123 These 
 
 120.  Id. at 138. 
 121.  See, e.g., Richard Davidson, Fix Gerrymandering with More Specifics, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, May 31, 2014, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2014-05-31/news/os-ed-letters-
texting-tragedy-053114-20140530_1_gun-owners-isla-vista-one-life (“Letters published [in this 
newspaper] describe the need for a change in the Florida legislative districts to rectify the evils 
of gerrymandering. This has been a problem for many years in Florida and elsewhere.”).  
 122.  Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306–07 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“When 
presented with a claim of injury from partisan gerrymandering, courts confront two obstacles. 
First is the lack of comprehensive and neutral principles for drawing electoral boundaries. No 
substantive definition of fairness in districting seems to command general assent. Second is the 
absence of rules to limit and confine judicial intervention.”). 
 123.  Hasen, supra note 12, at 22.  
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include seeking to amend the Constitution to overrule Citizens 
United; paying lip service to reform without taking any concrete steps 
to fix the problem (as Hasen believes President Obama has done); or 
giving up and doing nothing.124 Instead, Hasen seeks to defend what 
remains of campaign finance law and hopes that the Supreme Court 
overturns Citizens United.125 He writes that: 
The key is to lay the groundwork for the Supreme Court to reverse 
Citizens United and other cases, returning to its role of carefully 
balancing rights and interests in this very difficult arena. There will 
come a time in the not too distant future when Justice Scalia and 
Justice Kennedy will leave the Court, and if a democratic president 
appoints their successors, the Court’s campaign finance 
jurisprudence easily could turn back 180 degrees to its pre-Alito 
days.126 
This kind of argument is part of a growing trend of scholarship by 
progressive scholars in the campaign finance field that seeks either to 
outlast the Supreme Court, or else to better educate it and to change 
its mind. In the latter vein, Professors Daniel Tokaji and Renata 
Strause have recently argued that scholars should spend more of their 
energies on creating a better evidentiary record for the Supreme 
Court. They call for this, again, so that future campaign finance 
reforms can be reargued and defended within its chambers.127 As they 
explain explicitly, their goal is to document the “evidence that should 
be collected and developed to support the next generation of reforms 
before the next Supreme Court.”128 
This kind of advocacy amounts to wishful thinking, however. It is 
aimed at convincing a Supreme Court where the majority’s views on 
campaign finance have not changed significantly in forty years, and 
where that majority has only become more conservative over time 
since then. In other words, both process theorists and equality 
advocates believe that the majority of the current Supreme Court is 
unlikely to overturn Citizens United anytime soon, and they often 
explicitly say so.129 And yet, each of these camps, surprisingly, 
 
 124.  Id. at 30–33.  
 125.  Id. at 33–37.  
 126.  Id. at 35. 
 127.  Strause & Tojaki, supra note 12, at 181. 
 128.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 129.  See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 68, at 314 (stating that we “should put to bed the notion 
that the current Supreme Court can be persuaded to reverse its Citizens United course and 
impose some limitations on independent spending . . . in candidate elections”).  
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continues to frame its advocacy in terms of an appeal to the Supreme 
Court, seeing it as the institution of last resort.130 
What these approaches fail to appreciate is that the Supreme 
Court is ultimately the source of the impasse. In some ways, the courts 
themselves might be considered additional institutional settings in 
which campaign finance regulations are made. Along with Congress, 
they act as institutional players in the complex game of upholding—or 
striking down—campaign finance regulations. As things stand, the 
Supreme Court serves as the predominant institution in determining 
how money in politics is regulated. To the extent that there has been a 
call for scholars to take a more “institutional approach” to election 
law, and to give more thought to how the design of political 
institutions might translate into political outcomes, it has stopped 
short of calling for a reassessment of the role of the Supreme Court.131 
As such, what scholars have so far failed to see is that the Supreme 
Court itself has not been able to resolve the normative conflict 
referenced earlier between political freedom and political equality in 
any satisfactory way. 
True reform must begin by acknowledging this inherent conflict. 
Then, building on Lessig’s work, a way must be created for this 
conflict to be addressed at an institutional level. This necessarily 
means acknowledging that the Supreme Court is part of the 
institutional framework in campaign finance, and then questioning 
whether it should remain there or not. If not, then an intellectual 
argument needs to be constructed for why the Supreme Court lacks 
legitimacy when it comes to this area of the law and why the 
normative conflict in campaign finance should be resolved by the 
institution that happens to be democratically elected.132 That 
institution is Congress. And in the past, it has shown a remarkable 
willingness to expand campaign finance reform. In short, a true effort 
 
 130.  Id. at 306 (arguing that “[t]here could well be a time within the next decade when a 
more liberal Supreme Court majority may consider overturning recent precedent” and that the 
debates over political equity help “elucidate the best and worst types of . . . arguments to 
advance to a future Supreme Court and American public”) (emphasis added).  
 131.  See, e.g., Gerken & Kang, supra note 13, at 122. In political science, unlike in the legal 
academy, there has long been an emphasis on studying the way institutions influence political 
outcomes. For a foundational article, see James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New 
Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 738 (1984).  
 132.  See Pamela S. Karlan, Exit Strategies in Constitutional Law: Lessons for Getting the 
Least Dangerous Branch Out of the Political Thicket, 82 B.U. L. REV. 667, 673–74 (2002) 
(examining the ways that the Supreme Court could remove itself from deciding election law 
cases). 
MAZO 1.24.15 - MAZO FINAL VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 1/25/2015  2:01 AM 
2014] THE DISAPPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION 289 
at reform must begin and end at the congressional level.  
C.  Congress Must Lead 
Despite the Constitution’s silence concerning which branch of 
government should regulate campaign finance, the courts have 
functioned as an institution that is first above equals. In part, 
Congress must accept some of the blame for the outsized role that the 
courts currently play in determining the outcome of campaign finance 
disputes. This is because Congress has enacted special procedures to 
expedite campaign finance cases through the federal courts at a faster 
pace than other, typical cases that are filed there.  
Most federal cases follow a familiar three-tiered path through the 
federal courts. First, a case is filed in a federal district court, where a 
district judge initially examines and decides the dispute.133 After that, 
the party that loses at the district court level can appeal the district 
court’s decision to the court of appeals, which sits in panels of three 
judges.134 Finally, the party that loses at the court of appeals can either 
seek further review of the dispute from an en banc panel of the full 
court of appeals or, if the Supreme Court chooses to grant certiorari, 
from the Supreme Court itself.135  
Many election law cases, however, take a different path from this. 
As Professor Joshua Douglas explains: 
Federal court election law cases follow one of three trajectories. In 
the standard situation, a case originates in the district court, with 
direct review to a three-judge panel of the court of appeals, and 
then discretionary certiorari review to the Supreme Court. In some 
scenarios, however, the case is first argued to a three-judge panel 
of the district court, with direct review to the Supreme Court. In 
still other cases, a single district judge certifies any nonfrivolous 
constitutional challenges directly to the en banc court of appeals, 
with typical certiorari review to the Supreme Court.136 
The normal three-tiered path of a typical federal court case remains 
the most familiar,137 and Professor Douglas reports that between 2000 
and 2009 the Supreme Court decided fifteen election law cases that 
 
 133.  28 U.S.C.A. §§ 132(c), 1331, 1332 (West 2014). 
 134.  Id. at §§ 46, 1291, 1294. 
 135.  Id. at § 1254(1). 
 136.  Joshua A. Douglas, The Procedure of Election Law in Federal Courts, 2011 UTAH L. 
REV. 433, 446.  
 137.  Id. at 447.  
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came to it through this typical three-tiered process.138 
But for court challenges arising under the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Congress has specifically designated 
that a different procedure be followed. These cases are first heard by 
a three-judge district court panel in the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia, and the decision of the three-judge 
district court panel is then reviewed directly by the Supreme Court.139 
When a case is filed under BCRA, the chief judge of the court of 
appeals initially appoints the three-judge panel to hear it, and that 
three-judge district court panel must include at least one appellate 
judge. Once this three-judge panel rules, the losing party appeals the 
decision directly to the Supreme Court, which, by statute, does not 
have discretion to decline to decide the dispute.140 
By mandating that a three-judge district court panel comprised of 
both trial and appellate judges hear the dispute initially, and by 
requiring the Supreme Court to review any appeal, Congress has 
forced the Court into writing opinions on the constitutionality of 
campaign finance legislation. Of course, inserting an expedited, 
mandatory review requirement into this legislation in the first place 
was done deliberately by members of Congress who were either 
opposed to the statutory scheme and wanted the courts to rule saying 
so, or else who were in favor of it and wanted the courts to affirm it in 
a speedy manner.141 Either way, when the courts are forced to rule on 
legislation without having the ability to give it the careful 
consideration that lawsuits receive when they make their way to the 
Supreme Court following the three-tiered path typically taken by 




 138.  Id. at 447 n.85.  
 139.  See 2 U.S.C.A. § 437h (West 2014). Challenges brought under the Voting Rights Act, 
and challenges to the apportionment of congressional or statewide legislative districts, are also 
heard through this process. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1973c, 1973aa-2 (West 2014) (Voting Rights 
Act); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2284(a) (congressional and statewide legislative districts). 
 140.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1253 (West 2014); Douglas, supra note 136, at 456 (noting how “[t][he 
[Supreme] Court can ‘note probable jurisdiction, which means that it will conduct a full merits 
hearing on the case, or it can summarily affirm or summarily reverse, but either way the 
Supreme Court must decide the dispute’”).  
 141.  Id. at 476 (explaining how “[m]embers of Congress use the insertion of a particular 
judicial review process to slow down or speed up court interpretation of a new election law 
depending on their support of or opposition to the law, which can affect whether that law 
applies in an upcoming election”).  
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Prior to the adoption of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, the 
Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) likewise contained 
a unique process for judicial review. If a challenge was brought under 
FECA, a single district judge was required to certify non-frivolous 
constitutional challenges to a full en banc circuit court, thereby 
skipping the three-judge appellate panel altogether. Section 437h of 
FECA allowed “the [Federal Election] Commission, the national 
committee of any political party, or any individual eligible to vote in 
any election for the President of the United States” to assert a 
constitutional challenge to the statute in any federal district court, and 
from there the district judge certified review of the dispute directly to 
the court of appeals sitting en banc.142 Originally, Congress had 
mandated that there be non-discretionary review by the Supreme 
Court for FECA as well, but this provision was later eliminated.143 
Still, it was this original mandatory expedited review procedure that 
ultimately resulted in the Court having to hear and render a campaign 
finance decision in Buckley. 
These mandatory review provisions have forced the Court to show 
its cards and issue written opinions in campaign finance cases that the 
justices may have wished to avoid. Bringing challenges before the 
Supreme Court on the appellate docket, rather than the discretionary 
docket, has not helped reformers. “Five of the eight campaign finance 
cases taken by the Roberts Court have come up through the appellate 
docket, with the Court having no choice but to take the case,” explains 
Professor Bradley Smith.144 He continues: 
There is reason to believe that the Court would prefer not to take 
on many of these cases. Justice Roberts went out of his way to note 
the jurisdictional aspect in his lead opinion in McCutcheon, and 
the Court majority may not really be so eager to take on these 
divisive cases. But forced to do so, it has consistently come down 





 142.  2 U.S.C.A. § 437h (West 2014).  
 143.  Douglas, supra note 136, at 469. 
 144.  Bradley A. Smith, “The Forty Years War: Campaign Finance from Buckley to 
McCutcheon, and Possibilities for a Westphalian Peace” at 4 (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the author). 
 145.  Id. 
MAZO 1.24.15 - MAZO FINAL VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 1/25/2015  2:01 AM 
292 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 9:1 
 In short, when it comes to regulating money in politics, courts have 
played a greater role than being merely additional institutional 
settings in which campaign finance regulations get made. Even if this 
is a role that the Supreme Court has arguably, and ironically, been 
forced to take on because of Congress’s own actions, it is undisputed 
that the Supreme Court has now become the predominant 
institutional player in campaign finance. By deciding which laws can 
stand and which cannot, its rulings have had the effect of shaping our 
campaign finance discourse.146 To date, the Supreme Court has chosen 
to frame the issues surrounding the regulation of money in politics as 
an issue of free speech. As a result, for almost four decades, all 
congressional efforts at reform have been concerned with how to 
regulate campaign finance without running afoul of the First 
Amendment.147 But why must the Supreme Court have to have the 
last word on the subject? 
Figure 1 shows why proceeding through the courts may, in fact, be 
undesirable. First, even if an expedited procedure with mandatory 
appellate review is not taken, the path is inefficient, with potentially 
as many as six institutional “veto players” littered along the way.148 For 
example, any proposed bill limiting campaign finance would need the 
majority support of both the House and the Senate and then the 
President’s signature to become law. After that, its constitutionality 
might be uncertain for years to come as it winds its way through a 
district court, an appellate court, and finally gets to the Supreme 
Court—that is, if it does not get to the Supreme Court through an 
expedited review process such as the kind that Congress mandated 






 146.  See Briffault, supra note 48, at 176 (“The Court has been the preeminent force in 
shaping and constraining our campaign finance rules since Buckley v. Valeo in 1976, and the 
Court’s role as arbiter of what rules may or may not be enforced only continues to grow”). 
 147.  See ANTHONY CORRADO, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 96 (2000). 
 148.  The veto player is a political actor who has the ability to prevent a political decision 
from being enacted. In George Tsebelis’ well-known formulation, a veto player is one who can 
stop a change from the status quo from taking place. The more veto points there are involved, 
the more policy stability occurs. See GEORGE TSBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS WORK 19 (2002).  
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 By contrast, Figure 2 outlines a much simpler proposal for passing 
campaign finance rules that provides only one veto point in each 
chamber of Congress. Each chamber could adopt a regulation by a 
simple majority. After that, the enforcement of any reforms would be 
up to Congress, and the courts would not easily be able to get 
involved. There would be no statute to challenge. Court involvement 
would also violate the political question doctrine.149 To accomplish 
this, both the House and Senate could adopt ethical rules to regulate 
the activities of its members in campaign finance. 
The intellectual bedrock of this proposal can be found in Article I, 
Section 5, Clause 2 of the Constitution, which provides Congress with 
the authority to determine its own proceedings and to discipline its 
members.150 The powers of Congress to discipline its members include 
 
 149.  Several cases suggest that the House’s ability to discipline its members is not only 
broad but also unreviewable. See, e.g., Rangel v. Boehner, No. 13-540 (JDB), 2013 WL 6487502, 
at *26 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2013) (“In Discipline Clause proceedings, the Supreme Court has 
explicitly recognized that ‘[a]n accused Member is judged by no specifically articulated 
standards and is at the mercy of an almost unbridled discretion of the charging body . . . .’”); see 
also United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 519 (1972) (characterizing the House when it acts 
under its Expulsion Clause powers “as accuser, prosecutor, judge, and jury from whose decision 
there is no established right to review”).  
 150.  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, 
punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a 
Member . . . .”). Indeed, the same constitutional grant of authority that empowers each house of 
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not only expulsion but also censure, reprimand, letters of reproval and 
admonition, and requiring financial restitution.151 Through its own 
ethics rules, which already regulate gifts and lobbying,152 and at one 
time also regulated campaign finance,153 the House and Senate are 
able to pass “internal rules” that govern the campaign conduct of 
representatives.  
For violating these rules, Congress can actually expel its own 
members.154 Thus, Congress must now be called on to adopt new 
ethical rules and standards regarding campaign finance. The goal is to 
get members to police themselves by placing certain limits on future 
campaign contributions. Members who have taken the oath of office 
but fail to comply could face expulsion under Congress’s longstanding 
power to discipline the activities of its own members. 
Professor Lessig has helped us to understand the fact that we face 
a problem that is “institutional” in nature. But what he and others do 
not explicitly point out is that it may now also be time to reassess the 
role that the Supreme Court plays in America’s campaign finance 
debates. If the Supreme Court’s view is that limiting campaign 
expenditures and some forms of campaign contributions violates the 
First Amendment—and if combating corruption and the appearance 
of corruption are the only doctrinal justifications it will allow for 
 
Congress to regulate the conduct of its own members also arguably deprives the executive and 
judicial branches of that power.  
 151.  See JACK MASKELL, EXPULSION, CENSURE, REPRIMAND, AND FINE: LEGISLATIVE 
DISCIPLINE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31382.pdf.  
 152.  For the current House rules on these matters, see COMM. ON STANDARDS OF 
OFFICIAL CONDUCT, HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL (2008 ed.) [hereinafter HOUSE ETHICS 
MANUAL], available at http://oce.house.gov/pdf/2008_House_Ethics_Manual.pdf. Chapter 2 
covers gifts and explains the current congressional Statutory Gift Provision, 5 U.S.C.A. § 7353 
(West 2014) (“Except as permitted by [applicable gift rules], no Member of Congress . . . shall 
solicit or accept anything of value from a person [seeking official action from Congress or whose 
interests may be substantially affected by official action] . . . .”). It also covers other prohibitions 
in the Code of Official Conduct, House Rule 23, cl. 4—the House Gift Rule.  
 153.  JACOB R, STRAUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ETHICS: 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF ITS EVOLUTION AND JURISDICTION 8–9. (2013) (“In the 94th Congress 
(1975-1976), the House transferred jurisdiction over campaign finance contributions to the 
Committee on House Administration as part of the rules package.”). The House does not have 
any current rules relating directly to campaign finance. See HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra 
note 152, at 121 (the section on “Campaign Activity”). 
 154.  As of 2000, only fifteen senators and four representatives had been expelled from 
Congress, although many more resigned to avoid expulsion. See CONG. Q., GUIDE TO 
CONGRESS 944 (5th ed. 2000). In 2002, Representative Jim Traficant was expelled, bringing the 
total number of members expelled to twenty. See In the Matter of Representative James A. 
Traficant, Jr., 148 CONG. REC. H5375-01, 2002 WL 1676705 (daily ed. July 24, 2002) (recording 
the vote to approve H.R. RES. 495, 107th Cong. (2002), expelling Rep. Traficant).  
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placing limits on contributions—then one way to proceed is simply to 
cut the Court out of the equation.  
Recently, in order to bypass the Supreme Court, scholars have 
begun to look at alternative campaign finance strategies that are 
extrajudicial in nature. Because regulating campaign finance within 
the existing institutional architecture does not work, new strategies 
are slowly being proposed. Some of these proposals for changing the 
campaign finance system do not involve the courts at all. 
 
















For instance, various U.S. senators have recently advocated 
passing a constitutional amendment to overturn Buckley and Citizens 
United—in effect handing the power to regulate campaign finance 
back to Congress, if it might wish to use it.155 Such an amendment 
 
 155.  See, e.g., Examining a Constitutional Amendment to Restore Democracy to the 
American People: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2012), available 
at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/examining-a-constitutional-amendment-to-restore-
democracy-to-the-american-people. See also Dana Millbank, Editorial, A Solution Worse Than 
the Problem, WASH. POST, June 4, 2014, at A15;  Adam Liptak, Justice Stevens Suggests Solution 
for ‘Giant Step in the Wrong Direction’, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/us/politics/justice-stevenss-prescription-for-giant-step-in-
wrong-direction.html; Alexander Bolton, Senate Democrats Plan Vote to Reverse Citizens 
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would grant Congress, rather than the courts, responsibility for 
imposing its values in this arena. As this article went to press, 
however, this proposed amendment failed in the Senate.156 
Another novel extrajudicial proposal, this one advanced by 
scholars, involves granting citizens “democracy vouchers” to allow 
them to make contributions to campaigns in small-dollar amounts.157 
Giving every citizen a $50 voucher would raise $6 billion in an 
election cycle, if all U.S. citizens choose to give to political candidates 
and campaigns. This is more than the total amount raised by all 
campaigns in 2010 and 2012.158 The idea for democracy vouchers has 
been championed by Lessig, and a similar idea—to give out “patriot 
dollars”—has also been proposed by law professors Bruce Ackerman 
and Ian Ayres.159 
A third extrajudicial proposal, this one actually tested in 
Massachusetts, was used during the 2012 Senate campaign. By signing 
“The Peoples’ Pledge” in 2012, Senate candidates Scott Brown and 
Elizabeth Warren contracted around the ability of outside third-party 
groups to influence their Senate race.160 Brown and Warren’s contact 
required each candidate’s campaign to pay to charity the equivalent 
of 50 percent of any third party’s advertising costs for any negative 
advertisements that were run by third party groups during the 
campaign that benefitted their candidacy.161 Since their race, several 
other campaigns have adopted variations of the People’s Pledge.162 
Although such private contractual solutions are not without their 
 
United, THE HILL, Apr. 30, 2014, http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/204788-senate-democrats-
plan-vote-to-reverse-citizens-united-decision. 
 156.  The measure, S.J. RES. 19, 113th Cong. (2014), available at https://www.congress.gov 
/bill/113th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/19/text/170198, fell 54 to 42, short of the 60 votes 
necessary to close debate and move to a vote on the merits.  
 157.  See Lawrence Lessig, More Money Can Beat Big Money, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/opinion/in-campaign-financing-more-money-can-beat-big-
money.html?_r=0; see also LESSIG, supra note 54, at 266–70. 
 158.  Lessig, More Money, supra note 157. 
 159.  See BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM 
FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002) (proposing a two-part funding system that involves a private 
financing scheme in which individuals donate anonymously to a trust fund that supports the 
candidate of their choice and a public financing scheme in which every citizen has the power 
either to direct public money to a candidate or to delegate that money to an intermediary 
group); see also David A. Strauss, What’s the Problem? Ackerman and Ayres on Campaign 
Finance Reform, 91 CAL. L. REV. 723 (2003) (criticizing Ackerman and Ayres’s proposal).  
 160.  See Ganesh Sitaraman, Contracting Around Citizens United, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 755 
(2014). 
 161.  Id. at 758. 
 162.  Id. at 758–59 (listing races in Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Connecticut, 
and Maryland where a private contractual approach has been adopted or debated). 
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problems, the impetus behind them is the realization that relying on 
public solutions to curb third-party spending is unlikely to succeed as 
a reform strategy.  
These are, of course, novel and interesting ideas. The idea of using 
congressional ethics rules is not meant to supplant them, but to add to 
the mix. It calls for the House and Senate to adopt ethical rules 
limiting by geography how members are able to accept campaign 
contribution, such that it would be unethical to accept contributions 
from non-constituents who reside outside of a candidate’s district. In 
addition, the ethics rules would institute a ceiling on contribution 
limits as high as $10,000. Any elected candidate who violates the 
congressional ethics rules would face the prospect of having an ethics 
inquiry launched against him and potential expulsion from his 
respective chamber of Congress.  
The next Part examines Congress’s ethics rules to establish the 
framework for this congressional, as opposed to judicial, reform 
proposal. It also provides a template for how Congress can implement 
these ethics rules. But first, there is one final thing to say about why 
the role of the Supreme Court needs to be rethought. 
 Any reform proposal must begin by recognizing that Congress is 
unlikely to adopt any new major campaign finance legislation because 
of the possibility that it may be struck down by the Supreme Court 
for violating free speech. The challenge for advocates of reform 
during the past forty years has been to come up with a strategy to 
regulate the campaign finance system without running afoul of the 
First Amendment.163 Any “law” seeking to regulate the system would 
have to withstand a challenge in the courts and would have a high 
probability of winding up before the Supreme Court. As such, 
reformers currently face two dilemmas. The first is figuring out how to 
get Congress to sign onto a bipartisan reform proposal. The second is 
figuring out how to bypass the Supreme Court when it comes to 
enacting it.164 The ethics proposal solves the first dilemma. Because 
Congress is the branch of government that is democratically elected, 
 
 163.  See CORRADO, supra note 147, at 96.  
 164.  See Sitaraman, supra note 160, at 765 (2014) (noting how “Congress is fiercely divided 
on campaign finance issues, largely on partisan lines, rendering many . . . options unlikely to 
succeed in the short term. The constitutional amendments have limited support in Congress. 
The public financing options, to the extent they are not foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Arizona Free Enterprise [v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011)] . . . have not yet found 
their way to a vote in Congress . . . . In short, relying on a public law solution to third-party 
spending seem unlikely to succeed as a reform strategy in the short term”). 
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it should be up to Congress to decide how to regulate money in 
politics. 
III.  THE NEW PATH FORWARD 
A.  Congressional Ethics Rules 
Congress’s authority to discipline its members is found in Article 
I, Section 5 of the Constitution. It states that “[e]ach House may 
determine the Rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for 
disorderly Behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a 
Member.”165 However, until the 1960s, Congress had declined to 
establish formal rules of conduct or to exercise its powers to discipline 
its members.166 It is only within the last forty years that Congress has 
systematically undertaken disciplinary measures on itself.167 In 1958, 
Congress adopted a ten-point general Code of Ethics for government 
officials and employees.168 In 1964, the House and Senate separately 
adopted their own ethics rules and created bipartisan committees in 
each chamber to oversee these rules.169 
In 1964, the Senate created a bipartisan “Select Committee on 
Standards and Conduct.”170 In 1967, the House followed suit, 
establishing its own bipartisan “Committee on Standards of Official 
 
 165.  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 166.  JACOB R. STRAUS, ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT: AN 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 1 (2011). These disciplinary powers include not only expulsion but also 
censure, reprimand, letters of reproval and of admonition, and financial restitution. 
 167.  See MILDRED AMER, CONG. RES. SERV., HISTORY OF CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS 
ENFORCEMENT 1 (2005); CONG. Q., CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS: HISTORY, FACTS, AND 
CONTROVERSY 9 (1992) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS]. There are other regulations 
governing the activities that a member of Congress cannot engage in, but the bulk of these come 
in the form of criminal statutes. A series of laws found in Title 18 of the U.S. Code make it a 
federal crime for a member to solicit or receive bribes for the performance of any official act, 18 
U.S.C.A. § 201c (West 2014); solicit or receive anything of value for himself because of an 
official act performed, § 201g; receive any compensation in relation to any proceeding or 
controversy to which the United States is a party, § 203a; or buy votes, promise employment, 
and solicit political contributions from federal employees, or threaten the job of a federal 
employee who fails to give a campaign contribution, §§ 597–606. 
 168. See CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 167, at 145–46 (explaining how “no formal 
ethics guidelines existed until 1958, when Congress enacted a code applying throughout the 
government”).  
 169.  Id. at 145–46. The source for this power was again Article I, Section 5 of the 
Constitution, cited above. Congress can expel one of its members for violating its ethical rules, 
although it has so far been extremely reluctant to use this severe form of punishment.  
 170.  See STRAUS, supra note 166, at 3; 110 CONG. REC. 16,929–40 (1964) (adopting the 
“Proposed Amendment of Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate Relative to the 
Jurisdiction of the Committee on Rules and Administration” that created the Select Committee 
on Standards and Conduct). 
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Conduct.”171 In 1968, the House and Senate adopted financial 
disclosure regulations for members, officers, and standard 
employees.172 Intended to prevent conflicts of interest, the Senate’s 
rules spelled out the conditions under which senators could accept 
money at fund-raising events and the use toward which these 
contributions could be put. They also prohibited senators and their 
employees from soliciting campaign funds, and they required financial 
disclosure forms to be filed with the Comptroller General.173 The 
corresponding House rule on financial disclosure required that the 
information be available to the general public.174 
In 1977, after a decade under these rules, the House and Senate 
adopted revised, and largely similar, Codes of Ethics for their 
members and employees.175 These Codes of Ethics placed limits on 
outside earned income, and they required members of Congress to 
make public information about their income, gifts, financial holdings, 
debts, securities, commodity transactions, and real estate dealings.176 
Further ethics codes have been adopted since 1977, including an 
important one in 1999.177 Over the years, each chamber has reformed 
and refined its ethics rules on its own.178 
The creation of bipartisan committees, and the promulgation of 
new ethics rules, has not simply been done to appease the public. 
Since their creation, the House and Senate committees have initiated 
a litany of investigations into alleged ethical violations, several of 
which have resulted either in the resignation of the individual under 
investigation or in discipline issued by the chamber.179 More 
importantly, the ethics committees do not simply respond to alleged 
 
 171.  STRAUS, supra note 166, at 3.  
 172.  CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 167, at 3. 
 173.  GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 154, at 945. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. at 948.  
 176.  AMER, supra note 167, at 4 n.10. 
 177.  GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 154, at 978. 
 178.  The scope of what is to be regulated has also changed over time. See GUIDE TO 
CONGRESS, supra note 154; CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 167. See generally Kathleen 
Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet?: An Answer From Fiduciary Theory, 
1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57. For instance, in recent years changes have focused on reforming the 
rules regarding lobbyists. Congress tends to revise its ethics rules as new ethical dilemmas arise.   
 179.  See GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 154; CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 167; 
Paul M. Thompson, First Do No Harm: Why a Commissioner of Standards is Unhealthy for the 
American Body Politic, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 230, 231–32 (2008), available at 
http://thepocketpart.org/2008/04/17/thompson.html (“Over the past twenty-five years the Senate 
has moved to sanction eleven of its members. For three of them, the action led to the end of 
their careers. The House, too, has a solid record of sanctioning members.”). 
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ethical violations. These committees work proactively, training 
members of Congress about their obligations, providing confidential 
advice, and obtaining compliance through the threat of publicity.180 
Of course, at times this system has also been criticized for its 
weakness and for the members’ reluctance to punish their own.181 
Although the ethics committees have been vested by their respective 
houses with the authority to meet the investigative, adjudicatory, and 
advisory elements necessary for them to carry out discipline, they 
have also often operated with caution and been criticized as 
“watchdogs without teeth” because of their perceived reluctance to 
discipline colleagues adequately.182 While these criticisms may be 
valid, the multitude of individuals who have been investigated and 
ultimately disciplined supports the idea that, while the disciplinary 
process in Congress is not perfect, it also is not in a state of complete 
disrepair. Congress’s internal systems are at least somewhat effective 
at identifying, deterring, and punishing offenders.183 
The imperfections and successes of the congressional disciplinary 
system are illustrated by the reprimand of former Speaker of the 
House Newt Gingrich. Allegations were levied against Gingrich in 
1994.184 An investigatory subcommittee believed that the complaints 
were “probably tied to party politics and to Gingrich’s quest to lead a 
Republican takeover of Congress.”185 During the two-year long 
investigation, partisanship brought the ethics process to the breaking 
point.186 Still, despite partisan bickering, the ethics process served its 
function. A punishment was given that arose from a bipartisan effort. 
The bipartisan ethics committee approved Gingrich’s punishment on 
a vote of seven to one,187 and, by a majority vote, the House voted to 
reprimand Gingrich—the first time in the history of the House that its 
Speaker had been formally punished.188 Though there were 
disagreements along party lines about the perceived leniency or 
 
 180.  Thompson, supra note 179, at 232. 
 181.  Laura Krugman Ray, Discipline Through Delegation: Solving the Problem of 
Congressional Housecleaning, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 389, 389–90 (1994). 
 182.  AMER, supra note 167, at 3-4. 
 183.  Thompson, supra note 179, at 231–32. 
 184.  John E. Young, House Reprimands, Penalizes Speaker, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1997, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/govt/leadership/stories/012297.htm. 
 185.  GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 154, at 940. 
 186.  Young, supra note 184. 
 187.  Id.  
 188.  GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 154, at 940. 
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hardship of the punishment,189 there were several representatives who 
saw beyond the partisanship and focused on the ethical dilemmas at 
hand.190 
Gingrich’s case demonstrates the ways in which ethics 
investigations can prompt internal and external change. Gingrich 
faced opposition from members in his own party and nearly lost his 
position as Speaker.191 After the 1998 elections, amidst his weakened 
position and the loss of Republican seats, Gingrich ultimately 
resigned.192 Despite allegations of political motivation, the ethics 
process functioned. While each party did criticize the ultimate 
punishment, the ability of lawmakers to compromise, along with 
Gingrich’s resignation, potentially a result of the public outcry,193 
demonstrates that congressional ethics investigations can overcome 
obstacles and criticisms and mete out effective discipline. 
B.  Amending the Congressional Rules 
Today, Congress’s internal ethical rules are codified in the Code of 
Official Conduct.194 The House Committee on Ethics administers this 
code and is charged with investigating alleged violations. This is the 
same committee that evaluates and certifies all public financial 
disclosure reports from members of the House of Representatives.195 
The proposed internal campaign finance rules for Congress would 
need to be passed as amendments to this Code.  
Amendments to the Code of Official Conduct can be suggested by 
any member of the House in the form of a simple resolution. A simple 
resolution is a matter that pertains only to internal House operations 
and does need to not go to the Senate. Simple resolutions are 
presented like any other legislative bill. The proposed internal 
campaign finance regulations would first be sent to the House 
Committee on Ethics for consideration. They would additionally also 
be considered by the Committee on House Administration, which 
 
 189.  Young, supra note 184. 
 190.  Id.  
 191.  See GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 154, at 940.  
 192.  Id.  
 193.  It is possible that the loss of Republican seats in the 1998 election was due, in some 
part, to attitudes surrounding the Gingrich scandal. Cf. Thompson, supra note 179, at 233 
(describing the electoral consequences of perceived corruption in the 1994 and 2006 elections). 
 194.  RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 113TH CONGRESS 38–40 (2013) 
[hereinafter HOUSE RULES] (Rule XXIII), available at http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/house-
rules.pdf. 
 195.  STRAUS, supra note 166, at 6.  
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oversees legislation related to federal elections.196 These committees 
would discuss any proposed new regulations and suggest 
amendments. The proposed new regulations would then have to be 
passed by a simple majority of the House. 
Amending existing rules to allow Congress to self-regulate 
campaign financing would not be an extraordinary exercise of its 
authority over its members. Indeed, each chamber of Congress today 
could draw upon previously instituted rules. First, Congress already 
has an extensive set of rules which regulate cash-flow to members. 
These include limits on outside earned income,197 gifts,198 and 
contributions from lobbyists.199 Some of these rules, particularly those 
regarding outside earned income, have even been adopted in the face 
of pervasive institutional practices.200  
Second, previously, the House Committee on Ethics was given 
formal jurisdiction to regulate not only lobbying, but also activities 
involving “the raising, reporting, and use of campaign funds.”201 In 
1977, the authority to regulate these areas was subsequently removed 
from the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ethics.202 Nonetheless, these 
examples limiting sources of money that members previously had 
access to provide important historical precedent. In the past, Congress 
has enacted rules to regulate campaign finance, including rules that 
ended the practice of converting surplus campaign funds into 
personal funds.203 
Congress would thus be able to draw on these historical examples 
to limit the campaign contributions that its members may receive now. 
Before it does this, however, it should take into account several 
considerations when crafting ethics rules that might attempt to 
regulate the flow of campaign contributions to current members. The 
most important is avoiding judicial review. While Congress has the 
power to discipline its members and establish rules of conduct, there 
are important caveats that the amended rules should observe in order 
 
 196.  HOUSE RULES, supra note 194, at 7 (Rule X(1)(k)(15)). 
 197.  See CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 167, at 156 
 198.  See id. at 157. 
 199.  See Honest Leadership and Open Government Act, Pub. L. 110-81, 121 Stat. 735 
(2007) (codified as scattered sections of 18 and 2 U.S.C.A.). 
 200.  See CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS supra note 167, at 151–54 (describing the evolution and 
ultimate ban on honoraria). 
 201.  STRAUS, supra note 166, at 8–9. 
 202.  Id. at 9.  
 203.  See CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 167, at 156–57. 
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to stave off judicial review. 
First, the rules must be crafted so as not to limit campaign 
expenditures or independent expenditures by outsiders. The majority 
in Buckley distinguished between contribution limits and expenditure 
limits, treating all attempts to regulate the latter as running afoul of 
the First Amendment.204 Although in later cases individual justices, 
though not the majority, have rejected the distinction between 
contribution limits and expenditure limits,205 and the distinction has 
come under criticism from academic commentators,206 it has now been 
ingrained in our campaign finance jurisprudence to such an extent 
that changing it may counter-intuitively work to cause chaos within 
the political funding system. 
Second, the rules would likely have to be enacted to apply to only 
current members of Congress. The Supreme Court has previously 
ruled that although each house has the full power to discipline its own 
members, each house may not refuse to seat a member, unless the 
incoming member fails to meet one of the qualification requirements 
outlined in the Constitution.207  
As long as these two requirements are met, they should be 
sufficient to ensure that the new ethics rules are above review.208 Of 
course, this proposal could cause pushback from existing members 
who would see themselves as being at a disadvantage when it comes 
to challengers. They would be bound by the ethics rules of their 
chamber limiting their campaign contributions, while a challenger 
who is not a member of the chamber would not be. How this would 
work in practice requires some serious thinking. While the formula for 
getting around this hurdle is not yet very robust, it would surely 
require putting pressure on challengers and letting them know that 
when they get into Congress they will have to abide by the same rules. 
The media could also be used to put additional pressure on them, so 
 
 204.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21, 26–27 (1976). 
 205.  See, e.g., FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 518–19 (1985) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Although I joined the portion of the Buckley per curiam that 
distinguished contributions from expenditures, I now believe that distinction has no 
constitutional significance.”).    
 206.  See, e.g., Lilian R. DeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment 
and Campaign Finance, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045, 1062–63 (1985) (criticizing the distinction). 
 207.  See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522 (1969) (holding that Congress does not 
have the power to develop qualifications for its members other than those specified in Art. I, § 
2, cl. 1–2 of the Constitution and that no Congress could exclude a candidate member from 
being sworn in and taking his seat in the House once those qualifications are met). 
 208.  Cf. Barry v. U.S. ex rel Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 613 (1929).  
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as to highlight when challengers are not playing by the same rules of 
the game as incumbents. 
Rules on the acceptance of campaign contributions must strike a 
delicate balance. Importantly, they must not be so burdensome as to 
make it impossible to run a successful campaign. Nor must they be so 
excessive as to incentivize noncompliance. Yet the enforcement of 
well-drafted ethics rules will provide several benefits. And to the 
extent that limits are imposed on contributions, they should have one 
particular goal in mind—ensuring that members of Congress are 
primarily funding their campaigns through contributions from their 
own district’s constituents. The following tiered system of rules should 
be enacted notwithstanding existing legislation. 
First, members should be allowed to accept contributions only 
from individuals residing within their congressional districts—or, for 
senators, within their own states. Imposing a geographical limitation 
on who can contribute funds to a political campaign is a form of 
restriction that already exists in our campaign finance jurisprudence, 
given that non-citizen aliens are barred by federal law from 
contributing to state or federal political campaigns and from spending 
money to influence either state or federal elections.209 In finding that 
the federal government has an interest in barring foreigners from 
getting involved in American political campaigns, and thus upholding 
the bar against campaign contributions and independent spending by 
aliens, courts have not focused on the First Amendment rights of 
foreigners, but rather on whether these foreigners comprise part of 
the “political community.”210 
The rule against foreign nationals contributing money to 
American politicians shows that regulating political contributions by 
geography is possible, even if extending that regulation to American 
citizens simply living in a different state may still implicate First 
Amendment concerns, at least if done by statute. At the state level 
today, only Alaska and Hawaii seem to impose limits on out-of-state 
contributions to political candidates, and no state imposes limits on 
 
 209.  See 2 U.S.C.A. § 441e(a) (West 2014). See also Jessica Horrocks, Note, Campaigns, 
Contributions and Citizenship: The First Amendment Right of Resident Aliens to Finance Federal 
Elections, 38 B.C. L. REV. 771, 773–75 (1997).  
 210.  See, e.g., Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (D.D.C. 2011), aff'd, 132 S. Ct. 1087 
(2012) (“It is fundamental to the definition of our national political community that foreign 
citizens do not have a constitutional right to participate in, and thus may be excluded from, 
activities of democratic self-government.”). 
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out-of-state expenditures.211 Professor Jessica Bulman-Pozen has 
argued that the movement by courts to define noncitizens as being 
outside the political community can be recast into a movement to 
define residents of other states as being equally outside of the 
political community.212 After all, if the residents of one state cannot 
vote for political candidates in another state, it is inconsistent, from 
the doctrinal perspective, to argue that these same out-of-state 
residents should be able to contribute to campaigns in another state 
that is not their own.213 An ethics rule passed in each chamber of 
Congress barring out-of-state contributions may get around such 
jurisprudential inconsistencies. 
Second, the permissible level of contributions should be raised, 
perhaps to a cap of $10,000, for each member of Congress. Of course, 
for this to be allowed, even by way of an ethics rule, FECA would first 
have to be amended. However, if such a reform could be 
implemented, a fewer number of contributions will theoretically need 
to be raised from the people within a member’s district. This would 
alleviate some of the pressure on members of Congress to fundraise 
as often, for they would not have to contact as many individuals to 
receive the same amount of contributions, although of course it would 
not remove this pressure from them entirely. By raising the cap on 
contributions, on the one hand, but limiting them geographically, on 
the other, the rules would create true political communities comprised 
of a member’s own constituents. 
 
 
 211.  Alaska prohibits candidates from receiving contributions from out-of-state individuals 
exceeding specified amounts. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 15-13.072 (West 2014). Hawaii prohibits 
contributions from out-of-state individuals (other than family members) exceeding 30 percent of 
a candidate’s contributions. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-362 (West 2014). See also Jessica 
Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1137 n. 263 (2014). 
 212.  Bulman-Pozen, supra note 211, at 1138–39.  
 213.  Indeed, in other political contexts, courts have rejected the rights of out-of-state 
citizens to “seek information” from state governments. As Bulman-Pozen notes, in McBurney v. 
Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709 (2013), Rhode Island and California residents challenged the provision 
of Virginia’s state Freedom of Information Act, which limited access to the state’s public 
records to Virginia citizens and to media outlets with a presence in Virginia. Virginia defended 
its law as being protective of its political community, and the Supreme Court accepted that 
argument in upholding the statute. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 211, at 1142–43. Decisions 
such as these, however, create what can only been viewed as doctrinal inconsistency in the 
political arena. As things stand, out-of-state residents are allowed to influence elections in states 
that are not their own by sending campaign contributions to politicians across state borders, and 
by spending money on advertising in these states, but they are not allowed to vote in these 
states’ elections, nor to file freedom of information requests with their governments if these 
states choose to bar the out-of-state residents. 
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By forcing members of Congress to raise funds primarily from 
individuals located in their own districts, the system would not only tie 
the individual members more to their own districts, but would allow 
citizens to have more of a stake in the political process. A member of 
Congress would know that the constituents voting for him overlap 
with those people contributing to his congressional campaign, and, as 
a result, his fundraising interests and efforts will align better with the 
interests of his constituents. In theory, different funding markets 
should develop in different congressional districts over time, given 
that districts have different demographics.  
These rules would be an important first step in leveling the 
playing field for political participation. As a corollary, these rules will 
help limit the influence of outside interest groups in politics.214 This is 
not to suggest that all interest groups are inherently bad for 
democracy, but the rise of national interest groups does present 
certain problems.215 Increasing the importance of individuals within 
the candidate’s district may mitigate this problem to some extent. By 
placing geographic restrictions on contributions, the ethics system can 
ensure that local and state interests are given the largest stake in the 
political process. On the other hand, raising the amount of 
contributions will also potentially free up some of the time that a 
member needs to spend fundraising from small donations. 
These rules would also have the secondary effect of making the 
disclosure rules more effective. Increasing the amount of 
contributions received from individuals would bring a greater number 
of campaign contributions into the disclosure system. For those 
concerned about the influence of money in politics, this would 
provide a way for the electorate to understand and be able to discern 
more readily who is financing campaigns. As Justice Brandeis once 
quipped, “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectant; electric light 
the most efficient policeman.”216 Empirical research has proven that 
there is truth to this. The mere process of an ethics committee opening 
 
 214.  Even the framers expressed concern over the role of special interest groups. Referring 
to such outside groups as “factions,” they displayed suspicion toward them. See THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); see also MATT GROSSMAN, THE NOT-SO-SPECIAL 
INTERESTS: INTEREST GROUPS, PUBLIC REPRESENTATION, AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 6 
(2012). 
 215.  See Paul S. Herrnson, Christopher J. Deering, & Clyde Wilcox, Interest Groups 
Unleashed: Beyond the 2010 Election Cycle, in INTEREST GROUPS UNLEASHED 241 (Paul S. 
Herrnson et al. eds., 2013) (noting the potential of interest groups to deter new political 
candidates from running, and their potential to contribute to increased polarization).  
 216.  Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPERS WKLY., Dec. 20, 1913, at 10. 
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an investigation may be enough to provide the scandal for the public 
to oust a politician.217 
Perhaps most importantly, these rules could increase the strength 
of political parties. The strength of the party system provides for a 
unification of senators and representatives along party lines, ensuring 
that parties are able to garner the necessary votes to pass effective 
legislation, and to address issues of national concern.218 Professors 
Herrnson, Deering, and Wilcox note that one rationale for placing 
higher limits on campaign contributions is the strengthening of party 
politics.219 One result of achieving this desired effect is an increase in 
party discipline.220 In turn, the greatest benefit of increasing the 
strength of parties will be the increased ability for Congress to 
discipline its members.221 The increase in party discipline could, 
potentially, translate into each chamber being better suited to 
disciplining its members.  
C.  Investigations and Enforcement 
The House Committee on Ethics has the power to investigate 
alleged violations of the Code of Official Conduct.222 Matters for 
investigation can come before it through several channels. Members 
of the House may offer complaints to the Committee. Individuals who 
are not members may do so as well, if a member certifies that the 
complaint made against a House member is in good faith. The 
Committee can also undertake an investigation on its own, which it 
will do, for example, when a House member has been convicted of a 
felony. The House can also pass a resolution authorizing the 
Committee to investigate. Finally, the Committee hears claims 




 217.  See Vincent G. Moscardelli et. al., The Lingering Effect of Scandals in Congressional 
Elections: Incumbents, Challengers, and Voters, 94 SOC. SCI. Q. 1045, 1048 (2013) (arguing that 
although voters are not perfect at regulating politicians, they can still oust incumbents). 
 218.  A strong party system can ensure that national issues are being adequately and 
coherently addressed. See generally Raymond la Raja, Campaign Finance and Partisan 
Polarization in the United States Congress, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. PUB. POL’Y 223 (2014).  
 219.  See Herrnson, Deering, & Wilcox, supra note 215, at 240–41.  
 220.  Id. at 241. 
 221.  See CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 167, at 48–49 (noting that one additional 
potential punishment Congress may employ is referring a member to his party for discipline).  
 222.  STRAUS, supra note 166, at 7. 
 223.  HOUSE RULES, supra note 194, at 19 (Rule XIV).  
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When a matter is referred to the Committee on Ethics for 
investigation, the Committee Chair and Ranking Minority Member 
decide whether to form an investigative subcommittee and whether to 
pursue an investigation.224 An investigative subcommittee is made up 
of four members of the House, including two from each party.225 The 
subcommittee can take depositions, request disclosure of documents, 
and subpoena witnesses.226 When the subcommittee determines that a 
violation of the Code of Official Conduct has occurred, it issues a 
Statement of Alleged Violation.227 The respondent can respond, in 
which case an adjudicatory subcommittee is formed to hold a 
hearing.228 If the Committee determines that a violation has occurred, 
it holds a hearing to determine sanctions.229 The most severe sanction 
that the Committee on Ethics can recommend is expulsion from 
Congress, which must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the 
House.230 
In the history of the House of Representatives, only five members 
have ever been expelled, three of them during the Civil War era.231 
More often, rather than the member receiving formal sanctions, not to 
mention expulsion, the member will choose to resign.232 When a 
member of Congress resigns, the House Committee on Ethics loses 
jurisdiction over the matter.233 
For the proposal outlined here to work, enforcement must be 
consistent. Though well-intentioned, several ethics rules adopted by 
Congress have suffered from disparate enforcement. In the past, this 
was the result of several factors. There have been claims that ethics 
investigations were motivated by partisan politics. There was also 
inconsistent terminology used when handing down punishment.234 
More strikingly, there were differences in the procedure for carrying 
out what is considered to be the same punishment in each chamber.235 
 
 224.  Id. at 22–23. 
 225.  Id. at 29 (Rule XIX).  
 226.  Id. at 31. 
 227.  Id. at 32. 
 228.  Id. at 37. 
 229.  Id. at 43.   
 230.  Id.  
 231.  JACK MASKELL, RECALL OF LEGISLATORS AND THE REMOVAL OF MEMBERS OF 
CONGRESS FROM OFFICE 2–3 (2012). 
 232.  STRAUS, supra note 166, at 8–9. 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  See CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 167, at 25 
 235.  Id. at 25–26 (describing the different processes for censure in the House and Senate).  
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When drafting new rules, each chamber must strive to implement 
formality in its proceedings so as to make them more transparent to 
members and to the public. This has been made easier with the 
implementation of rules that now expand the previously limited 
ability of members to bring complaints.236 These rules should be 
expanded to let members bring more complaints. An automatic 
triggering mechanism may be implemented as well, so as to remove 
any doubt about the motivation behind an investigation. Not only will 
this ensure the rules are being applied consistently, but it may also 
help to increase the credibility of each chamber. 
In its 2014 Annual Report, the Committee on Ethics for the 113th 
Congress stated that it had completed 27 investigations.237 It issued 
four public statements in relation to these investigations, but no 
sanctions were handed out. However, in its 2012 Annual Report the 
Committee disclosed that it had issued a Letter of Reproval to one 
member of the House238 and a $10,000 fine to another member for 
using official resources for campaign and personal purposes and also 
for obstructing the Committee’s investigation.239 
D.  Practical Limitations 
Traditionally, Congress has disciplined its members only for the 
most egregious violations. Indeed, rather than discipline, the system 
has had to rely on voters to oust any member whose conduct makes 
him unworthy to hold office.240 There are limitations, though, on 
voters’ abilities to oust incumbents. One is structural. Elections 
happen every few years, and political memories are short. The long 
time between elections hinders the ability of the electorate to remove 
politicians from office because of their conduct.241 Even if an ethics 
scandal is fresh enough in the minds of voters to punish a member of 
the House of Representatives, it is likely that Senators would face 
 
 236.  See e.g., AMER, supra note 167, at 6. 
 237.  STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ETHICS, 113TH CONG., ANNUAL REP. ON THE ACTIVITIES OF 
THE COMM. ON ETHICS FOR THE ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS (FIRST SESSION) 8 
(Comm. Print 2014), available at https://ethics.house.gov/sites/ethics.house.gov/files/2013%20 
Annual%20Report.pdf. 
 238.  Id. at 38. 
 239.  Id. at 52–53.  
 240.  See AMER supra note 167, at 1.   
 241.  See Moscardelli, supra note 217, at 1046 (explaining that typically “incumbents recover 
much of their lost margins in their first postscandal election,” and may regain their pre-scandal 
levels of support within four to six years).  
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little threat of being ousted due to a scandal.242 
Additionally, there is always the possibility that voters will reelect 
an incumbent regardless of his conduct.243 If an incumbent is caught 
up in a scandal while campaigning for reelection, it still may not be 
enough to persuade voters to turn out against him.244 After all, the 
politician may be able to persuade voters not to oust him because of 
other good deeds he did for his district. The recent example of 
Charles Rangel, the long-time member representing Harlem in New 
York, may be instructive. Congressman Rangel has faced various 
ethics inquiries over the years, in each case inviting challengers. Yet he 
keeps winning the Democratic primary and getting reelected to 
Congress.245 In sum, the short memories of voters, combined with the 
length of terms, may make it risky to rely on voters as the means for 
regulating the conduct of Congress. 
Still, although few members of Congress have ever been expelled, 
the empirical evidence suggests that being subjected to a 
congressional ethics inquiry makes reelection more difficult. Although 
48.9 percent of members did win the general election,246 this is much 
lower than the general incumbency rate of members of Congress, 
which has historically hovered above 90 percent.247 
There are also other limitations to the proposed rule that deserve 
to be considered. First, there is the potential that new ethics rules 
could do more harm than good. Scholars such as Professor Beth 
Nolan argue that a plethora of rules addressing questions of ethics 
 
 242.  In a study of scandals from 1972 to 2006, 13.6 percent of incumbents were voted out in 
the general election, 11.4 percent were defeated in the primary election, and 26.1 percent 
resigned or retired. However, 48.9 percent won the general election. See id. at 1048. While 
Moscardelli’s study focused solely on scandals in the House of Representatives, his results can 
be extrapolated to the Senate. Senators might experience an even swifter bounce-back if the 
number of years between their scandal and re-election is greater than two. Their name not 
appearing on the ballot may have the effect of keeping their scandal out of the voters’ minds, 
making it more difficult for opponents to mobilize against an incumbent. 
 243.  Id. at 1048.  
 244.  Id.  
 245.  See Bill Lynch, How Charles Rangel Keeps Winning, 34 CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS 33 
(2013) (explaining how “[a]lthough Rangel’s public image reached a nadir when he was 
censured [by Congress] in 2010, virtually the entire political establishment in New York 
continued to support him” and Rangel won reelection). 
 246.  See Moscardelli supra note 217, at 1048.  
 247.  See, e.g., DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, RICHARD L. HASEN, & DANIEL P. TOKAJI, 
ELECTION LAW 145 (2012) (“In only three years between 1950 and 2008 were more than 10 
percent of incumbents running in general elections defeated, and the figure only exceeded 11 
percent once. If incumbents defeated in primaries are included, there were six years in which 
the incumbent seeking reelection lost, but the figure never reached 15 percent.”). 
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“leads to the problem of legalism. Questions of ethics become ones of 
coloring inside the lines.”248 While this is a possibility, well-drafted 
rules can address Nolan’s concerns. Nolan rightly considers the 
regulation of ethics in terms of its real consequences, as “something 
more than a set of fungible rules about how to behave while in 
government.”249 To satisfy her concerns, ethics rules have to be 
promulgated not merely as substitutes for “laws,” but as the 
codification of our society’s existing values.250 
Second, there remain practical concerns regarding enforcement. 
Even when Congress enforces ethics rules and punishes its members, 
we have no way of knowing what percent of actual offenders are 
being disciplined.251 The House could censure five members for rules 
violations over the course of an election cycle, and facially it would 
appear that the House Ethics Committee is doing its job. However, if 
we learned that there were actually fifty violators, we would not view 
the rules as being effective at deterring and punishing conduct. 
Heightened disclosure requirements combined with the ability of 
private individuals to bring complaints to the Ethics Committee may 
provide a solution, but even this would not be foolproof. It is more 
likely that the most egregious violators will be brought to light by 
dedicated watchdog groups. Even then, some members of Congress 
will be able to skirt the rules. 
Additionally, there is the expulsion problem. Expelling a senator 
or representative requires a two-thirds vote of his colleagues in his 
chamber.252 This supermajority can be difficult to muster. While some 
individuals who come under an ethics investigation may voluntarily 
resign rather than face discipline,253 the harshest penalty that the 
majority of violators will receive is censure.254 Even if this may provide 
an impetus for voters to remove the individual from office when the 
next election comes around, it may also have the effect of decreasing 
 
 248.  Beth Nolan, Regulating Government Ethics: When It’s Not Enough to Just Say No, 58 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 405, 407 n.18 (1990).   
 249.  Id. at 416. 
 250.  Cf. STRAUS, supra note 166, at 4 (noting how congressional ethics have changed with 
societal perceptions of wrongdoing). 
 251.  Josh Chafetz, Curing Congress’s Ills: Criminal Law as the Wrong Paradigm for 
Congressional Ethics, 117 YALE L. J. POCKET PART 238, 239 (2008).  
 252.  U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 5. 
 253.  See e.g., CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 167, at 18–19 (noting one senator and 
two representatives who resigned in the face of open investigations). 
 254.  Id. at 1 (“No Senator has been expelled since 1862.”); id. at 18 (detailing the first 
expulsion of a representative since the Civil War, in 1980). 
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the public’s trust of Congress as an institution.  
There are potential ways to mitigate this effect. As part of the 
standardization of disciplinary measures, a requirement should be 
instituted requiring any congressional censure or reprimand to be 
accompanied with a referral to the member’s political party for 
further disciplinary actions.255 Additionally, it should be mandatory 
that notice, and the text, of a censure or reprimand, be posted on 
Congress’s website. Ultimately it will be up to a Congress to draft and 
revise its rules in ways that not only deter certain conduct, but also 
maintain the public’s faith in the institution. 
One final roadblock that would need to be addressed is that the 
existing Code of Official Conduct states that no complaint about a 
member can be entertained within sixty days of an election in which 
that member is a candidate.256 Because of the time-sensitive nature of 
campaign finance regulations, this rule may need to be amended. 
E.  Final Thoughts 
Although each chamber of Congress has a Code of Conduct, the 
low incidence of sanctions seems to indicate that it is not being 
enforced rigorously. In order for the internal regulations proposed 
here to be passed and enforced, there would need to be a great deal 
of public attention and insistence focused on the issue. The sixty-day 
pre-election limitation that is currently part of the congressional 
ethics rules would also need to be amended. This reform proposal is 
obviously not without faults. But it also has a significant benefit—it 
seeks to avoid another confrontation with the Supreme Court.257 
Of course, there may be the perception that Congress will 
ultimately be unable to regulate itself.258 And even if Congress is 
capable of self-regulation, there are those who will continue to argue 
that it should still be held accountable to some outside, independent 
agency.259 As this article has tried to demonstrate, historically Congress 
has had some success with self-regulation. At the end of the day, the 
ethics rules and their enforcement through congressional committees 
 
 255.  See CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 167, at 48 (noting the Democratic Caucus’s 
mechanism for punishing members who are subjected to serious disciplinary action).  
 256.  HOUSE RULES, supra note 194, at 16–17 (Rule XI(3)(b)(8)(D)). 
 257.  See Ian Millhiser, Liberals Just Need to Stay Away from the Supreme Court, SLATE 
(May 24, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/05/when_ 
will_liberals_learn_to_stay_the_heck_away_from_the_supreme_court.html. 
 258.  See AMER, supra note 167, at 4 n.10 and accompanying text. 
 259.  See, e.g., Krugman Ray, supra note 181, at 440. 
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will only be as effective as the public’s perception of wrongdoing. But 
to the extent that Congress is able to transform existing ethical 
obligations into institutional norms, especially when it comes to 
campaign finance, new ethical rules may help avoid the otherwise 
inevitable challenges that would be launched against any potential 
campaign finance reforms if those same regulations were otherwise 
enacted as statutes. 
CONCLUSION 
Often in life, how we define a problem becomes a problem itself. 
That is certainly true when it comes to the narrow conversations that 
the Supreme Court has forced us to have concerning campaign 
finance reform. To buck this trend, we need to move away from the 
Supreme Court’s straightjacket. We need to start a different kind of 
conversation. 
Building on Professor Lessig’s work, we can begin this effort by 
viewing campaign finance regulation from a more institutional 
perspective. When one institution will not allow popular reforms to 
proceed, we must contemplate ways to get around the roadblock. One 
viable alternative involves changing the way that our campaign 
finance regulations are promulgated. In order to circumvent the 
narrow constitutional framework introduced in Buckley, the option 
that this article has proposed is to proceed through internal 
congressional rules or a Code of Ethics, rather than by statute. This 
would require novel commitments. However, these commitments 
would be no greater than those needed currently from both houses of 
Congress to pass the same regulations in the form of a statute. 
True reform cannot go through the Supreme Court. Rather, it 
must begin with Congress passing ethical guidelines to impose 
contribution limits on its own members, to have those contributions 
be limited geographically, and to have members police each other so 
as to ensure that they each abide by the new rules or risk expulsion 
from the Senate or the House of Representatives. At the end of the 
day, this proposal will not provide an easy solution to what is a 
difficult problem. But to the extent reforms are necessary, they will 
only be hastened when Congress is placed on a more equal footing 
with the Supreme Court in this important area of the law. 
The sooner we begin discussing reforms like these, the sooner we 
can cease debating the meaning of corruption. 
